Abstract
Unquestionably the most significant introspectionist program in the United States was the “structuralism” of E. B. Titchener. Titchener was concerned to establish the claim that the “new psychology” imported from Germany had made psychology a rigorous empirical science. Lacking a nontrivial account of science, Titchener supported his claim by emphasizing the analogies between psychology as he saw it and an established experimental science—viz. physical chemistry. To understand Titchener’s vision of psychology, therefore, we do well to examine his model briefly.
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References
R. Gregory, Mind in Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
G. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysic (Leipzig: Breitkopf and Hartel, 1860). Trans. H. Adler, Elements of Psychophysics (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1966).
E. Titchener, An Outline of Psychology (New York. Macmillan, 1897).
E. H. Weber, De Tactu (Leipzig. 1834). Available in translation as The Sense of Touch, trans. E. Ross and D. Murray (New York: Academic Press, 1978).
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953).
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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Cummins, R. (1991). The Introspectionism of Titchener. In: Smith, JC. (eds) Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 46. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-1242-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2161-0
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