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Alternate Approaches

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Book cover What is Said

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 49))

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Abstract

There are a number of competing approaches to both the question of what determines what is said when an indexical sentence is uttered, and just how to handle Donnellan’s examples, urged in the literature. It is these that I wish to discuss in this chapter. I shall argue against the prevalent idea that context determines what is said. I shall then suggest that some prominent attempts to explain away the phenomena Donnellan has isolated do not succeed. Finally, I shall provide the oft-promised discussion of the suggestion that ’the ϕ’ can have a demonstrative reading.

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Notes

  1. Paul Ziff, “What is Said”, p. 709.

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  2. Ziff, p. 713. Later (p. 716) he notes that given our current understanding, “Such a supposition is best seen as at best a heuristic maxim”.

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  3. Ziff, p. 715. (No source is given for Patton’s example.)

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  4. Ziff, p. 716.

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  5. Montague, “Pragmatics and Intensional Logic”, p. 98.

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  6. Scott Weinstein, “Truth and Demonstratives”, p. 184.

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  7. John R. Searle, “Referential and Attributive”.

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  8. Searle, “Referential and Attributive”, p. 142.

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  9. Ibid., p. 144 (italics in original).

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  10. Ibid., p. 145.

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  11. Ibid., pp. 146–47.

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  12. Ibid., p. 147.

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  13. Ibid., pp. 144–50.

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  14. Ibid.

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  15. Ibid., pp. 146–47.

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  16. Ibid., p. 147.

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  17. Ibid., p. 147–48.

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  18. Ibid., p. 13.

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  19. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

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  20. Wettstein, “Demonstrative Reference”, p. 244.

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  21. Devitt, “Donnellan’s Distinction”, p. 523 n. 9.

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  22. Devitt, p. 519.

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  23. Wettstein, p. 245.

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  24. Devitt, p. 517.

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  25. “Tutting Humpty Dumpty Together Again”, p. 204, n. 5.

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  26. Lockwood, “On Predicating Proper Names”, p. 485, n. 21.

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  27. Designation, p. 174.

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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bertolet, R. (1990). Alternate Approaches. In: What is Said. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 49. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2061-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2061-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7425-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2061-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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