Once Again on the Meaning of Physical Concepts

Abstract

In a series of papers (Baltas 1987, 1988, 1989a), I have been trying to develop a structuralist/constructivist approach to the structure and to the dynamics of Physics drawing, on the main, from two sources: On the one hand, the ‘structuralist’ program pioneered by J. D. Sneed (Sneed 1971, Stegmüller 1976, 1979 and Balzer et al. 1987) and, on the other, the neomarxist conception of science developed by Louis Althusser and his students (Althusser and Balibar 1972, Althusser 1973, Fichant and Pêcheux 1971, among others). In a nutshell, this approach states: Physics is made up from three interconstitutive ‘elements’ — its object, its conceptual system and the experimental transactions specific to it. Each of these elements becomes what it is and performs its epistemic function only on the basis of the relations it entertains with the other two²: The conceptual system picks up the phenomena that are to make up Physics’ object (which we may call ‘natural phenomena’) and transforms them into what we may call ‘physical phenomena’, that is phenomena apprehended and treated only on the basis of this system’s concepts, only as ‘dressed’ by the ‘clothes’ composed by the system. For example, the conceptual system of Physics transforms a falling apple into a ‘point mass attracted by a gravitational force’.

The present paper owes its existence to many people but above all to two: When I first started to work on the ideas constituting the present approach, Enrique Eduardo Marí forcefully pointed out to me that, sooner or later, I would be obliged to face the question of meaning. And when I had developed the outline of my account, W. A. Suchting was kind enough to pose me a series of tough question. In trying to answer him, I came to realize that I could hope to cope with his questions only with the help of another long paper. Finally, it is both my duty and pleasure to thank here Professor T. S. Kuhn. His generous comments on my (1987) not only encouraged me more than I can say but also helped me to clarify a good number of points directly related to what is at issue in the present paper. Although I an not sure if he will agree with the way I exploited his remarks, his influence is, I think, readily discernible.