Identities and Manifolds
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In summarizing chapter four, I suggested that difficulties in Gurwitsch’s interpretation of Husserl, difficulties concerning the categorial differences between perceptual noemata and perceived objects and concerning the relationship between perceptual appearances (noemata) and the perceived object (the noematic system), could be overcome only by denying Gurwitsch’s claim concerning the identity of the noema and the intended object or by redefining the relationship between noemata and the object. In chapter four, I have argued that the former fails as an interpretation of Husserl, since Husserl does in fact adopt the view that the noema is the object precisely as intended and that the innermost moment of the noema, the determinable “X” is the formally characterized, identical, intended object itself.
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Causal Property Primal Impression Perceptual Appearance Hyletic Data
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- 1.This follows John J. Drummond, “On the Nature of Perceptual Appearances or Is Husserl an Aristotelian?”, The New Scholasticism 52 (1978): 1–22.Google Scholar
- 3.Cf. Drummond, “Seeing,” esp. §§III–V.Google Scholar
- 4.DR, 159–61; cf. Ideen II, 20, 56–58; APS, pp. 13, 299.Google Scholar
- 5.Cf. Drummond, “Seeing.”Google Scholar
- 8.Cf. Ulrich Claesges, “Intentionality and Transcendence,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. II (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972), p. 288. This essay also appeared in German: “Intentionalität und Transzendenz,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. I (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 91–99.Google Scholar
- 10.Cf., e.g., APS, pp. 110, 112–16, 120, 180; cf. also Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, p. 155.Google Scholar