Abstract
In the last paragraphs of the previous Chapter we alluded to the theoretical controversy between those who believe that the courts must give effect to community moral standards in their decisions (especially in the “hard cases”, where the outcome is not controlled uncontroversially by the valid legal rules) and those who deny the legitimacy of such an appeal to conventional morality. It is now time to consider the arguments of both advocates and opponents of the judicial appeal to conventional morality in greater detail. The best example of the latter position is provided by the argument by John Hart Ely:
There are two possible reasons one might look to consensus to give content to the Constitution’s open-ended provisions. One might say one was seeking to protect the rights of the majority by ensuring that legislation truly reflect popular values. If that were the purpose, however, the legislative process would plainly be better suited than the judicial. This leaves the other possible reason for the reference, to protect the rights of individuals and minority groups against the actions of the majority.... Now think again about the consensus and the message will come clear: it makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.1
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Notes
J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 68–69, footnote omitted.
Id. at 67.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (Burger C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 443 (Powell J., dissenting).
Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1107 (H.L.) (Dilhorne, V.).
See in particular H.H. Wellington, “The Nature of Judicial Review”, Yale Law Journal 91 (1982) 486,
H.H. Wellington, “The Nature of Judicial Review”, Yale Law Journal 91 (1982) 493–94.
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Ely, supra note 1, at 219 n. 118.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See H. H. Hyman, P. B. Sheatsley, “Attitudes toward Segregation”, Scientific American 195 (December 1956) 35.
H. H. Hyman, P. B. Sheatsley, “Attitudes toward Segregation”, Scientific American 195 (December 1956) 36.
(1982) 56 A.L.J.R. 625. This proposition can be advanced only tentatively because the moral issue of racial discrimination was clouded by a controversy about the external affairs power of the Commonwealth. But, legal formalities aside, the High Court in effect invalidated the anti-Aboriginal policy of the government of a state in which unfavourable sentiments and traditions toward Aborigines are more prevalent than in Australia as a whole.
Ely, supra note 1, at 73–104.
K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951).
R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 125.
See T. Sandalow, “Judicial Protection of Minorities”, Michigan Law Review 75 (1977) 1162,
T. Sandalow, “Judicial Protection of Minorities”, Michigan Law Review 75 (1977) 1187–88.
[1972] A.C. 877.
Addie v. Dumbreck [1929] A.C. 358.
[1972] A.C. at 897.
Reg v. Knuller [1973] A.C. 435, 455.
[1973] A.C. at 455.
Id. at 480.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–153 n. 4 (1938).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
For references, see my “Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards”, Virginia Law Review 73 (1987) 339, 351 nn. 43–48, 352 n. 51.
For references, see Id. at 352–53, nn. 58, 59, 66.
Herrington v. British Railways Board [1971] 1 All ER 897, 902 per Salmon LJ.
Shaw [1961] 2 W.L.R. at 938 per Lord Morris.
Id. at 940 per Lord Hodson.
R. v. Brodie (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 507, 528 per Judson, J.
For references, see Sadurski, supra note 26, at 253 nn. 72, 73, 74.
Moller v. Keimoes School Committee, 1911 S. Afr. L.R. App. Div. 635, 643–44 per Lord de Villiers, C.J. (arguing that school segregation on racial grounds is legally permissible).
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Towne Cinema Theatres, (1985) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 13.
Repouille v. United States 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), discussed in Chapter 1 above.
Regina v. Dominion News & Gifts (1962) Ltd., (1963) 42 W.W.R. 65, 80 (Man. Ct. App.) (Freedman, J.A., dissenting), rev’d, 1964 S.C.R. 251 (Can.).
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 678 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 434 (quoting unreported District Court opinion).
B. C. Hennessy, Public Opinion (Belmont: Wadsworth 1965), p.345.
Id. at 345–6.
L. Free and H. Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 37.
V. O. Key Jr, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 162–177.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Geelong Harbor Trust v. Gibbs Bright [1974] 2 A.L.R. 362, 369, emphasis added.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973).
See, e.g., Towne Cinema Theatres (1985) D.L.R. at 6, quoting the judgment by the Court of Appeal of Alberta in the same case.
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frankfurter J., concurring).
For several examples of this judicial attitude, see Sadurski, supra note 26, at 361–62.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 361, quoting Frank J. in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (1952), footnote omitted.
Furman, at 362, footnote omitted.
Id. at 362–9.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976).
Id. at 168–187 (plurality opinion by Justice Stewart).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 295, 299, 300, emphases added.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 296–300.
This is Ely’s term, supra note 1, at 67.
Wellington, supra note 5, at 494, footnote omitted.
H.H. Wellington, “Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication”, Yale Law Journal 83 (1973) 221, footnote omitted.
H.H. Wellington, “Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication”, Yale Law Journal 83 (1973) 244.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 244.
Wellington, supra note 6, at 493.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 514 n. 133.
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth 1977), pp. 248–253.
M. J. Perry, “Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process”, UCLA Law Review 23 (1976) 689,
M. J. Perry, “Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process”, UCLA Law Review 23 (1976) 735.
Id. at 731.
M. J. Perry, “Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases”, Northwestern Law Review 71 (1976) 417, n. 189.
M. J. Perry, “Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases”, Northwestern Law Review 71 (1976) 447.
Id. at 442 n. 164.
Id. at 442.
Perry, supra note 76 at 729.
Id. at 729, emphasis added.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 730 n. 195.
Repouille v. United States 165 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1947).
408 U.S. at 370 n. 163, emphasis added.
E.L. Hartley & R.E. Hartley, Fundamentals of Social Psychology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 549.
R. T. LaPiere, “Attitudes vs. Actions”, Social Forces 13 (1934) 233.
See e.g. Furman, 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger C.J., dissenting) and at 437 (Powell J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–181 (plurality opinion by Stewart, J.).
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
W. Ebenstein, Today’s Isms (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1954), p. 99.
W. Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1955), p. 100.
J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 296.
Ebenstein, supra note 91, at 99.
See E. S. Griffith, J. Plamenatz, J. R. Pennock, “Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium”, American Political Science Review 50 (1956) 101,
E. S. Griffith, J. Plamenatz, J. R. Pennock, “Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium”, American Political Science Review 50 (1956) 103,
E. S. Griffith, J. Plamenatz, J. R. Pennock, “Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium”, American Political Science Review 50 (1956) 118,
E. S. Griffith, J. Plamenatz, J. R. Pennock, “Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium”, American Political Science Review 50 (1956) 129.
J. W. Prothro & C. M. Grigg, “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement”, Journal of Politics 22 (1960) 276.
Id. at 285, table 1.
Id. at 283, 285.
See Key, supra note 44, at 50.
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Sadurski, W. (1990). Judicial Responses to Moral Pluralism (II): Conventional Morality in Judicial Decisions. In: Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1928-0_2
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