Ideal Objects and Skepticism: A Polemical Point in Logical Invėstigations
I have reached the conviction that the commonly accepted interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900/01) is, to a significant extent, wrong.1 As is known, it was read as far more than a contribution to descriptive psychology as it was cultivated by Franz Brentano and his disciples; and also as far more than a new general theory of science of Leibnizian character. It was received as the program and the beginning of a new First Philosophy that broke down the strong bulwarks of the Neo-Kantian transcendental idealism and of Positivism, succeeded in re-opening the domain of things themselves and their being-in-themselves, and that connected, therefore, in a new manner and thanks to a new method, with the great pre-Kantian, and even pre-Cartesian, tradition of Western thought. When it was not possible any longer to go on cherishing the hope of having anything similar again, Philosophy became realistic and showed again, in fact, that the essence of reality is accessible to human understanding. The Critique of Pure Reason all at once stood refuted, along with the Phenomenology of Mind and the Course of Positive Philosophy. And this happened solely as the result of the work of a researcher whose former writings had not at all hinted that such an extraordinary phenomenon was to be expected.
KeywordsLogical Investigation Ideal Object Logical Object Transcendental Idealism Pure Logic
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.Edmund Husserl, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, § 36, A 121. And, above all, Logical Investigations, Fifth Investigation, Chap. I.Google Scholar
- 13.Cf. my “Acerca del fundamento de la ontología formal: Aporía del realismo e imposibilidad del nominalismo,” in: J. Pérez Ballester (ed.), Anáisis y síntesis (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1984), pp. 173–207.Google Scholar