Abstract
The widespread support for term limitations seems to have caught both popular commentators and academic researchers by surprise.1 Why do voters want them? and What is the likely impact of such legislation? A small but growing literature concentrates on the first of these two questions (Adams and Kenny, 1986; Dick and Lott, this volume). In contrast, this paper addresses the second. In particular, it investigates the empirical consequences of imposing a twelve-year (six-term) tenure limit on the members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
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Endnotes
A more detailed discussion of the methodology employed in calculating expected lengths of completed tenure can be found in Reed and Schansberg (1992).
For theoretical analyses of the last period control problem, see Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). Little evidence of last period shirking behavior exists. Recent papers reporting little or no evidence of shirking are Vanbeek (1991), Lott and Davis (1992) and Lott and Bronars (1993). For a theoretical discussion of why empirical studies may have difficulty identifying last period shirking behavior, see Lott and Reed (1989).
Under a no grandfathering term limit regime, and using continuation rates from 1985–1991, 229 congressmen (52.6 percent) would enter the first Congress after term limit legislation was passed. Twelve years later, 168 congressmen (38.6 percent) would enter. The numbers based on the 1977–1991 continuation rates are similar.
Entering classes for the 94th to the 98th Congress (1975–1983) were 61.2 percent Democratic, with an average class size of 83.4. Entering classes for the 99th to the 102nd Congress (1985–1991) were 51.0 percent Democratic with an average class size of 45.7.
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Reed, W.R., Schansberg, D.E. (1996). An Analysis of the Impact of Congressional Term Limits on Turnover and Party Balance. In: Grofman, B. (eds) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Studies in Public Choice, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1812-2_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1812-2_9
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