The Last Dogma of Empiricism?

Abstract

This is, in the jargon of 25 years ago, a paper about the fact/value distinction, or, better, the science/values distinction. The question mark in the title concerns whether the science/value distinction is a dogma or a defensible distinction to be drawn within holism. I begin from the position of a Quinean holist and argue that value claims should be seen as part of our holistic world theory that is, as a whole, supported by experience. However, I do conclude that there may still be a distinction, though perhaps one of degree, to be drawn between values and value laden claims and other parts of our world theory. The moral of this paper will be that whether there is a science/values distinction of some sort is far less important than is the recognition of two “facts” about “values”, that values frequently do influence the course of science and that we cannot, for this very reason, afford to treat values as matters of personal preference or as subjective or as in any other way wholly or even largely exempt from the standards of evidence and evaluation that apply to science itself.

There are two plausible claimants to this title, epistemic individualism, which has already been undermined by Lynn Hankinson Nelson and other, and the science/value distinction. This is a paper about the latter.