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The Firm as an Experimental Machine -- Its Decision Problem

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Firm Objectives, Controls and Organization

Part of the book series: Economics of Science, Technology and Innovation ((ESTI,volume 8))

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Abstract

In contrast to the classical model, the model of the experimentally organized economy is well supported by empirical evidence. Particularly convincing evidence is that top level CHQ departments of firms are organized as if the EOE is the market environment in which they operate. This chapter will illustrate how. Above all, business firms have by now all but abandoned the notion of a plannable, potentially full information economy, implicit in management practice of the 1960s, and closed down their strategic or long-range forecasting and planning departments. This development could be seen coming already by the mid-1970s, in the wake of the crisis years. The more biased towards planning machines the less successful the firms were in weathering the 1970s (Eliasson 1976a, 1984c).

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Notes

  1. using Romer's (1986, p. 1015) formulation for an economy for a firm.

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  2. The mathematical derivation has been taken directly from Eliasson (1992b).

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  3. Rational expectations learning is normally not possible in non-linear models with explicit selection processes like entry and exit. See Lindh (1993).

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  4. For a critical view, see Penrose (1952).

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  5. See the discussion on complexity and non-linear dynamics in Chapter II where no static equilibrium can exist and a natural distinction between uncertainty ang risk arises.

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  6. This position is taken by, for instance, Solow (1990).

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Eliasson, G. (1996). The Firm as an Experimental Machine -- Its Decision Problem. In: Firm Objectives, Controls and Organization. Economics of Science, Technology and Innovation, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1610-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1610-4_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7218-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1610-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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