Introduction

  • Peter Slezak
Part of the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 7)

Abstract

While the papers in this volume were written independently of one another, there is a clear overall unity in their concerns, with a few common threads discernable throughout. These reflect issues of central interest within cognitive science and include in particular the computational view of the mind. The purpose of this introductory essay is to act as a guide to the contributions by summarising their central arguments and also offering some brief commentary where appropriate.

Keywords

Cognitive Science Mental Rotation Propositional Attitude Folk Psychology Modular Decomposition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Slezak
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Cognitive ScienceUniversity of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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