Alternative conceptualizations, which often turn into acrimonious oppositions, already abound in psychotherapy. The humanists condemn the behaviorists; the existentialists defend the patient as subject against what they take to be Freudian objectification; family therapists define themselves in opposition to individual therapists. Nevertheless, I wish to propose an alternative to these alternatives, since I am convinced that these oppositions pale in the light of two fundamentally opposed but complementary views of the mind. I will call these alternative conceptions of the mind and of psychopathology, epistemological and ontological, and will contrast Freud’s fundamentally epistemiological approach with Merleau-Ponty’s ontological account.
Intentional Content Collier Book Epistemological Relation Epistemological Conception Medical School Department
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access