Presuppositions and the Normative Content of Probability Statements

  • F. John Clendinnen
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 206)


Arthur W. Burks has argued with care and in detail for a theory of ampliative inference with a number of important and unique features. The outcome of his work in this area is contained in Chance, Cause, Reason (1977). Central to his system is his concept of inductive probability. His analysis of this concept has been strongly influenced by C. S. Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning. According to this theory we should equate the meaning of a statement with “the set of those practical conditionals that are logically implied by the statement” (p. 167). This can not be applied directly to probability statements; since the practical consequences of scientific statements must so often be expressed in terms of probability. So as to develop a satisfactory pragmatic theory of probability, Burks relates inductive probability on the one hand to a Calculus of Choice and on the other to empirical probability and causation.


Probability Statement Inductive Logic Deductive Logic Inductive Probability Probability Calculus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Burks, Arthur W.: 1943, ‘Peirce’s conception of logic as a normative science’, Philosophical Review, LII, pp. 187–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Burks, Arthur W.: 1963, ‘On the significance of Carnap’s system of inductive logic for the philosophy of induction’, pp. 739–759 in Shillp (1963).Google Scholar
  3. Burks, Arthur W.: 1977, Chance, Cause, Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  4. Carnap, Rudolf: 1950, Logical Foundations of Probability, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Google Scholar
  5. Carnap, Rudolf: 1952, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  6. Carnap, Rudolf: 1963, ‘Replies and systematic expositions’ pp. 859–1013 in Schlipp (1963).Google Scholar
  7. Clendinnen, F. John: 1977, ‘Inference, practice and theory’ Synthese, 34, pp. 89–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Clendinnen, F. John: 1982, ‘Rational expectation and simplicity’ in McLaughlin (1982) pp. 1–25.Google Scholar
  9. Colodny, Robert G.: 1966, Mind and Cosmos, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  10. Goodman, Nelson: 1965, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (Bobbs-Merril Co., Indianapolis(First edition 1955).Google Scholar
  11. McLaughlin, R.(ed.): 1982, What? Where? When? Why?, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
  12. Reichenbach, H.: 1949, The Theory of Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley.Google Scholar
  13. Salmon, Wesley, C: 1966, ‘The foundation of scientifc inference’, pp. 135–275 in Colodny (1966).Google Scholar
  14. Schillp, P. A.: 1963, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle.Google Scholar
  15. Searle, John R.: 1970, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  16. Strawson, P. F.: 1952, Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuén, London.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • F. John Clendinnen
    • 1
  1. 1.Melbourne UniversityAustralia

Personalised recommendations