Is Rational Economics as an Empirical-Quantitative Science Possible?
The question — Is rational economics as an empirical-quantitative science possible? — appears to be unnecessary because it can apparently be answered only with a short and final “yes”. Is it not the case that quantitative and empirical disciplines have been successfully established in the field of economics for some time? And what actually exists must, finally, be possible. Another question — Is metaphysics possible as a science? — a question that philosophers since Kant have struggled with time and again, was first asked — by Kant himself — at a time when no one disputed the fact that metaphysical disciplines had a place at the universities. And, of course, the metaphysics of Kant’s time presented itself as a science, even as the methodologically primary science. Kant’s question, not unlike the more recent critique of metaphysics by the analytic philosophers, was aimed at exposing the reigning illusion of philosophical thought. In the same vein, I would like to take up the following question. Has not the nearly completed reorganization of economics into an empirical-quantitative enterprise subtly bestowed the appearance and standing of exact science upon pseudo-problems?
KeywordsRational Economic Narrow Sense Joint Production Traffic Service Cost Concept
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