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Law, Ideology and Punishment

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Law, Ideology and Punishment

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 12))

Abstract

Many years ago, Maine wrote that ‘All theories on the subject of Punishment have more or less broken down; and we are at sea as to first principles.’1 What causes a theory to break down? Why should a society be all at sea as to the basic principles of a central and morally crucial institution? How did this situation come about? Is it symptomatic at the level of ideas of some deeper ailment in the social body? The impetus to these questions came out of the development in philosophical thinking about punishment in the late 1970s and early 1980s when it had become clear that the existing theoretical and practical consensus around punishment was no longer sustainable. In penological thinking, the belief in rehabilitation and the benign potential in punishment had given way to cynicism and disillusion, while, paralleling this in philosophical discussion, there was an increasing rejection of both the philosophy of treatment and what came to be seen as the empty nostrums of utilitarian theory. When utilitarianism was not being amoral in vindicating individual punishment for the greater good, it was being positively immoral in sacrificing individual justice to social well-being. The debate about punishing the innocent had rumbled on for decades without setting anvwhere.2

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References

  1. Speeches, p. 123, quoted in L. Radzinowicz and J. Turner, The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (London, 1945), p.48.

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  2. A. Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishment (New York, 1976), p.xxxiv; see below, Chapter IX.

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  3. See, for example, J.G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice and Therapy (Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 77–147.

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  4. A.E. Bottoms and R. Preston, The Coming Penal Crisis (Edinburgh, 1980).

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  5. From F. Neumann and O. Kircheimer, Social Democracy and the Rule of Law (London, 1987), p.70.

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  6. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth, 1977).

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  12. See for example B. Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (London, 1984) pp. 189–203, and D. Garland, Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish: An Exposition and Critique’ (1987) American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 847.

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  25. E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: a General Theory (London, 1978), General Theory (op.cit), p.119. Cf. Neumann, The Rule of Law (op.cit), ch.14. I also use the terms ‘social’ and ‘state’ power interchangeably.

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  27. I represent this movement in a necessarily schematic form which ignores complexities and unevenness in historical development: see, on the developments in penal policy, the compromises identified by Garland in his Punishment and Welfare (Aldershot, 1985);

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  29. See Neumann’s work in particular, as well as more recent analyses by R. Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York, 1976)

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  31. E. Kamenka and A. Tay, ‘Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: the Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology’ in E. Kamenka and R. Neale, Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (London, 1975). pp. 129–130.

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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Norrie, A.W. (1991). Law, Ideology and Punishment. In: Law, Ideology and Punishment. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0699-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0699-0_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6800-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-0699-0

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