Paradox and Reference

  • Michael Kremer
Chapter

Abstract

Since the publication of Kripke’s “Outline of a Theory of Truth” in 1975, we have seen a flood of work on the Liar paradox. However, only more recently have there been efforts to extend the results of these investigations to contexts in which structurally similar paradoxes arise. In this paper I aim to contribute to our understanding of paradox by showing how the techniques and ideas of Kripke can throw light on paradoxes associated with the idea of reference. I will presuppose familiarity with the basic ideas of Kripke, 1984; notation will be congruent with that in Kremer, 1988.

Keywords

Function Symbol Atomic Formula Truth Predicate Valuation Scheme Liar Paradox 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Kremer

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