The market for characteristics of property rights

  • Anthony Scott
Part of the International Studies in Economics and Econometrics book series (ISEE, volume 21)


The goal of this paper is to construct a model for visualizing the “production” of new characteristics of property rights. The building blocks of the model are the standard elements in a competitive model of a market: demand and supply. By providing a way of looking at the process by which the economy — or society — is able to provide its interests in land with new characteristics, the model brings some order to the observation of the underlying factors. For example, in the creation of statutory rights of way for railroads, the desire of the builders to avoid owing to adjoining landowners a royalty on traffic was a factor underlying their demand for certain characteristics in the new rights.


Transaction Cost Private Property Public Land Supply Function Land User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Allen, Robert C.: 1982, “Efficiency and distributional consequences of eighteenth-century enclosures”, Economic Journal 92, 937–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Allen, Robert C.: 19-, “Collective Invention”, Economic Journal.Google Scholar
  3. Baldwin, Robert: 1985, The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.Google Scholar
  4. Becker, Gary: 1983, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3), 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bonfield, Lloyd: 1983, Marriage Settlements, 1601–1740. The Adoption of the Strict Settlement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  6. Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan: 1985, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 144–9.Google Scholar
  7. Breton, Albert: 1974, The Economic Theory of Representative Government, Aldine Publishing, Chicago.Google Scholar
  8. Breton, Albert, 1990, “The Organization of Competition in Congressional and Parliamentary Governments”, this volume.Google Scholar
  9. Breton, Albert, and Ronald Wintrobe: 1982, The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct, Cambridge University Press, London.Google Scholar
  10. Clifford, Frederick: 1885 and 1887,A History of Private Bill Legislation, 2 vols., Butterworths, London; new impression by Frank Cass & Co., 1968.Google Scholar
  11. Cooter, Robert D.: 1983, “The Objectives of Private and Public Judges”, Public Choice 41 (1), 107–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Downs, Anthony: 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper, New York.Google Scholar
  13. Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal: 1985, “Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture”, American Economic Review 75, 352–367.Google Scholar
  14. Feeny, David: 1987, “The Supply of Institutional Change” in V. Ostrom, ed, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  15. Friedman, Wolfgang: 1972, Law in a Changing Society, 2nd ed., Columbia, New York.Google Scholar
  16. Hayek, Friedrich, A.: 1960, The Constitution of Liberty, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  17. Herskovits, M.J,: 1952, Economic Anthropology: The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples, Norton, New York.Google Scholar
  18. Kerridge, Eric: 1969, Agarian Problems in the Sixteenth Century and After, New York, Allen & Union Ltd. London.Google Scholar
  19. Lerner, A.P.: 1944, The Economics of Control, Macmillan, New York.Google Scholar
  20. Libecap, Gary D.: 1978, “Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights”, Journal of Economic History 38 (June), 49–70.Google Scholar
  21. Macaulay, T.B.: 1885, History of England, Volume 5, W.L. Aliison, New York.Google Scholar
  22. Mattheews, R.C.O.: 1986, “The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth”, Economic Journal 96 (December), 903–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Nelson, Robert H.: 1986, “Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property Rights Evolve”, University of Illinois Law Review,.Google Scholar
  24. Niskanen, W.A. Jr.: 1971, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, Chicago.Google Scholar
  25. North, Douglas C.: 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York.Google Scholar
  26. North, Douglas C.: 1979, “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History”, Explorations in Economic history 16 (3) (July), 249–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Offert, Avner: 1981, Property and Politics 1870–1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology and Urban Development in England, Cambrige University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  28. Olson, mancur: 1964, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  29. Plucknett, Theodore: 1956, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., Butterworth, London.Google Scholar
  30. Posner, Richard: 1977, Economic Analysis of Law, Little Brown, Boston.Google Scholar
  31. Rackham, Oliver: 1980, Ancient Woodland, Edward Arnold, London.Google Scholar
  32. Ruttan, V.W. and Y. Hayami: 1984, “Toward a theory of incluced institutional innovation”, Journal of Development Studies 20 (4), 203–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Scott, Anthony and James Johnson: 1985, “Property Rights: Developing the Characteristics of Interests in Natural Resources”, in Anthony Scott, ed., Progress in Natural Resources Economics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 376–403.Google Scholar
  34. Simpson, A.W.B.:1986, A History of the Land law, 2nd Ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  35. Simpson, A.W.B.: 1984, “Legal Liability…Rylands v. Fletcher”, Journal of Legal Studies 13, 209–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Smith, Adam: 1776, Modern Library ed 1937, ed. Edwin Cannan, The Wealth of Nations, modern Library, New York.Google Scholar
  37. Tate, W.E.: 1967, >The English Village Community and the Enclosure Movements, Gollancz, London.Google Scholar
  38. Williamson, Oliver E.: 1986, Economic Organization, Wheatsheaf, London.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony Scott

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations