Personal Identity and Concrete Values
In “The Moral Sense in the Origin and Progress of the Social World,” A-T. Tymieniecka points out that the experience of “moral valuation” arising in the individual’s interactions with the life-world has been neglected in the contemporary philosophical emphasis on the cognitive process of the experience of abstract values.1 Here I wish to contribute to the understanding of the process of “moral valuation” through an examination of the role of concrete values in achieving self-identity.
KeywordsPersonal Identity Moral Valuation Rational Egoism Moral Weight Moral Phenomenology
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- 1.Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XV ( Reidel: Dordrecht, 1983 ), pp. 8–10.Google Scholar
- 2.Bernard Williams argues the priority of this individual orientation in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985 ).Google Scholar
- 5.Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanation (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 456–7. Cf. pp. 422–5,452-8, 524–7 and 610–3.Google Scholar
- 6.Edmund Husserl, Ideas (Collier, 1972), p. 245.Google Scholar