Personal Identity and Concrete Values

  • Evelyn M. Barker
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 31)


In “The Moral Sense in the Origin and Progress of the Social World,” A-T. Tymieniecka points out that the experience of “moral valuation” arising in the individual’s interactions with the life-world has been neglected in the contemporary philosophical emphasis on the cognitive process of the experience of abstract values.1 Here I wish to contribute to the understanding of the process of “moral valuation” through an examination of the role of concrete values in achieving self-identity.


Personal Identity Moral Valuation Rational Egoism Moral Weight Moral Phenomenology 
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  1. 1.
    Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XV ( Reidel: Dordrecht, 1983 ), pp. 8–10.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bernard Williams argues the priority of this individual orientation in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985 ).Google Scholar
  3. 5.
    Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanation (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 456–7. Cf. pp. 422–5,452-8, 524–7 and 610–3.Google Scholar
  4. 6.
    Edmund Husserl, Ideas (Collier, 1972), p. 245.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Evelyn M. Barker
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MarylandBaltimore CountyUSA

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