Thing and Thought

  • Don Perlis
Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 5)

Abstract

Self-reference or self-applicability is an important theme throughout Computer Science, from recursive programs to undecidability results, from bootstrapping to program semantics. A relative latecomer to this list is Artificial Intelligence, for only recently has self-reference been seen as an important attribute of intelligent systems. This paper will give a bird’s-eye (and personal) overview of some of the issues surrounding self-reference in AI, especially those related to non-monotonicity, reification, and intentionality.

Keywords

Nonmonotonic Logic Recursive Program Syntactical Treatment Liar Sentence Program Semantic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Don Perlis

There are no affiliations available

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