A Framework for Reasoning with Defaults

  • Hector Geffner
  • Judea Pearl
Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 5)


Belief commitment and belief revision are two distinctive characteristics of common sense reasoning which have so far resisted satisfactory formal accounts. Classical logic for instance, cannot accommodate belief revision: new information can only add new theorems. Probability theory, on the other hand, has difficulties in accommodating belief commitment: propositions are believed only to a certain degree which dynamically changes with the acquisition of new information.


Belief Revision Default Theory Default Logic Default Reasoning Background Context 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hector Geffner
  • Judea Pearl

There are no affiliations available

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