A New Normative Theory of Probabilistic Logic
Every rational decision-making procedure is founded on some theory of probabilistic logic (also called a theory of rational belief). This article proposes practical and logically correct theories of rational belief that are more general than the probability theory we learn in school, yet remain capable of many of the inferences of this latter theory. We also show why recent attempts to devise novel theories of rational belief usually end up being either incorrect or reincarnations of the more familiar theories we learned in school.
KeywordsProbabilistic Logic Probability Assignment Belief Function Rational Belief Finite Additivity
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