Advertisement

The Belief-Desire Model of Decision Theory Needs a Third Component: Prospective Intentions

  • J. Nicolas Kaufmann
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 178)

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to make a contribution, from the point of view of the analytical philosophy of action, to a critical evaluation of the standard model of rational choice, i.e. the model of expected utility maximization. This model is actually confronted with serious difficulties. The one I will take up is a problem raised by the economist Strotz in his seminal paper on «Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization» (1955/56), developed by Machina (1989) and more recently by McClennen (1990).

Keywords

Separability Condition Expected Utility Maximization Dynamic Consistency Independence Axiom Dynamic Choice 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Audi, Robert, 1986, ‘Intending Intentional Action, and Desire’, in Joel Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire, Precedent, Chicago, pp. 17–38.Google Scholar
  2. Beardsley, Monroe, 1978, ‘Intending’, in Alvin Goldman and Jagwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 163–184.Google Scholar
  3. Brand, Myles, 1984, Intending and Acting, Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
  4. Bratman, Michael E., 1987, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
  5. Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon, Oxford.Google Scholar
  6. Ginet, Carl, 1990, On Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  7. Hammond, Peter, 1976, ‘Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice’, Review of Economic Studies 43, 159–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hammond, Peter, 1988, ‘Consequentialism and the Independence Axiom’, in Bernard Munier (ed.), Risk, Decision, and Rationality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 503–516.Google Scholar
  9. Kim, Jagwon, 1976, ‘Intention and Practical Inference’, in Juho Manninen and Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Essays on Explanation and Understanding, Studies in the Foundations of Humanities and the Social Sciences, D. Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston.Google Scholar
  10. Machina, Marc J., 1989, ‘Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice Under Uncertainty’, Journal of Economic Literature 27, 1622–1668.Google Scholar
  11. McCann, Hugh, 1986, ‘Rationality and the Range of Intention’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 191–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. McClennen, Edward F., 1990, Rationality and Dynamic Choice, Foundational Explorations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  13. Mele, Alfred R., 1992, Springs of Action, Understanding Intentional Behaviour, Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  14. Pollack, Robert A., 1968, ‘Consistent Planning’, Review of Economic Studies 40, 391–401.Google Scholar
  15. Pollack, Robert A., 1970, ‘Habit Formation and Dynamic Demand Function’, Journal of Political Economy 78, 745–763.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Pollack, Robert A., 1976, ‘Habit Formation and Long-Run Utility Functions’, Journal of Economic Theory 13, 272–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Schütz, Alfred 1932, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Eine Einleitung in die verste-hende Soziologie, Springer Verlag, Wien, 1960.Google Scholar
  18. Schick, Frederic, 1984, Having Reasons, An Essay on Rationality and Sociality, Princeton University Press, Princeton.Google Scholar
  19. Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality, An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  20. Strotz, Robert H., 1955/56, ‘Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization’, Review of Economic Studies 23, 165–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Yaari, Menahem Dawns, 1977, ‘Endogenous Changes in Tastes: A Philosophical Discussion’, Erkenntnis 11, 157–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Nicolas Kaufmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Université du Québec à Trois-RivièresCanada

Personalised recommendations