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The Belief-Desire Model of Decision Theory Needs a Third Component: Prospective Intentions

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 178))

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to make a contribution, from the point of view of the analytical philosophy of action, to a critical evaluation of the standard model of rational choice, i.e. the model of expected utility maximization. This model is actually confronted with serious difficulties. The one I will take up is a problem raised by the economist Strotz in his seminal paper on «Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization» (1955/56), developed by Machina (1989) and more recently by McClennen (1990).

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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Kaufmann, J.N. (1996). The Belief-Desire Model of Decision Theory Needs a Third Component: Prospective Intentions. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-6537-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-0113-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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