Abstract
The question “how could anyone be irrational?” probably sounds rather odd to those who consider examples of irrationality to be pervasive in human behavior. In any case, since truly irrational behavior would be totally unpredictable and not amenable to scientific analysis, the social sciences are based on the idea that there is at least some rationality in human behavior. This is the reason why what is usually called the principle of rationality plays a key role in the foundations of the social sciences, and especially of economics. In its most straightforward formulation, this fundamental principle affirms that human action is rational, generalizing the idea that people, after all, have reasons for doing what they do. But such a claim suggests that any action whatsoever is rational in the sense that it has a rationale. However, this seems to overshoot the mark, for if it were no longer possible for someone to act irrationally, what would it mean for an action to be rational? Even without raising this problem in these terms, many theoreticians of the social sciences have been bothered by this paradoxical situation and have proposed various ways to cope with it. In this paper, I would like discuss a few problems raised by the views of some among them on this issue.1
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Notes
Mises, Ludwig von, 1976, Epistemological Problems of Economics, New York, New York University Press, pp. 23–24.
Mises, Ludwig von, 1944, ‘The Treatment of “Irrationality” in the Social Sciences’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 3(June), p. 544.
Robbins, Lionel, 1952, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2d edition, London, Macmillan & Co (1st ed. 1932), see pp. 94–99; Robbins does not couch his argument in terms of rationality, but this notion is implied by the way he uses the notion of “economic men”.
Machlup, Fritz, 1955, ‘The Problem of Verification in Economics’, The Southern Economic Journal 22, 1 (July), pp. 1–21. Machlup was engaged in two memorable debates about this issue, one with Hutchison (see The Southern Economic Journal 22, 4, 1956, pp. 478–493), the other with Lester (see American Economic Review, 1946–47).
Popper, Karl, 1985, ‘The Rationality Principle’, in D. Miller, ed. Popper Selections,Princeton University Press; previously published in French translation under the title “La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité”, in Classen E. M. (ed.), Les fondements philosophiques des systèmes économiques, textes de Jacques Rueff et essais rédigés en son honneur, Paris, 1967.
Becker Gary S., 1962, ‘Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory’, Journal of Political Economy LXX, Feb., pp. 1–13; reprinted in Becker, Gary S., 1976, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Elster, Jon, 1984, Ulysses and the Sirens, Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, New York, Cambridge University Press, Paris, la Maison des sciences de l’homme (1st edition, 1976), p. 140.
Elster, Jon, 1983, Sour Grapes, Studies in Subversion of Rationality, New York, Cambridge University Press, Paris, la Maison des sciences de l’homme, section I.
Elster, Jon, 1984, Ulysses and the Sirens, Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. New York, Cambridge University Press, Paris, la Maison des sciences de l’homme (1st edition, 1976), p. 86.
Elster, Jon, 1986, ‘Introduction’, in Elster, Jon ed. (1986), Rational Choice, New York, New York University Press, p. 15.
Elster, Jon, 1984, Ulysses and the Sirens, Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, New York, Cambridge University Press, Paris, la Maison des sciences de l’homme (1st edition, 1976), p. 65.
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© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Lagueux, M. (1996). How Could Anyone Be Irrational?. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_11
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