Abstract
A naïve perspective on the world suggests that the world we live in is full of vague objects. In this chapter, a version of the supervaluationist framework will be proposed to provide a systematic conception of such a naïve perspective. Precisifications of a vague object will be characterized as objects that, were they actual objects, every determinate truth about the vague object would be true about them. It will be argued that this view is more effective than other versions of supervaluationism at accommodating commonsensical and metaphysical considerations. The view leaves room for vague identity as a kind of “no fact of the matter.” Thus, Evans’ argument against ontic vagueness fails in a natural way.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
A note on terminology: In this chapter “vagueness” and “indeterminacy” will be used interchangeably, both being substitutable by “vagueness-related indeterminacy.” Of course, there may be indeterminacies which are not vagueness related, such as indeterminacies caused by open future. A list can be found in Williams (2008b). Here, however, we are only concerned with vagueness-related indeterminacy.
- 2.
Throughout this chapter we will take a conservative approach to logical issues. Since the proposed view is a version of supervaluation, it is safe to assume that classical logic can be preserved in some way or other. As such, the present proposal can be considered independent of logic-related issues. For discussions see Williamson (1994), Keefe (2000), Akiba (2004), Williams (2008c), and Barnes (2010).
- 3.
It does not matter what its color is actually. It may be brown, black, or any other color. Take your choice.
- 4.
As we mentioned at the outset, we are concerned with spatial boundary vagueness. One main exception, however, will be Geach’s Paradox, below, in which the parthood relation plays a role. This is not a fatal deviation, since the idea of precisification makes sense there and thus the present proposal works.
- 5.
Not all precisifications are admissible, only those which are consistent with determinate facts. For more on this see Fine (1975).
- 6.
- 7.
Here it is assumed, for the sake of example, that baldness is a property in the world.
- 8.
In Fine’s semantics there are intermediate points between a base point and any limit point, too. However, these intermediate points do not play a role in what has been stated here.
- 9.
There are sentences in Fine’s paper that may be considered as contrary to what has been said in this paragraph and following. One such sentence is, “Vagueness is ambiguity on a grand and systematic scale.” It is tempting to say that this kind of unification of vagueness and ambiguity makes Fine’s view more like Lewis’s than what is suggested in this chapter. In fact, this is not the case. The evidence from his paper, a couple of paragraphs after that quote, is this: “Ambiguity is like the super-imposition of several pictures, vagueness like an unfinished picture, with marginal notes for completion. One can say that a super-imposed picture is realistic if each of its disentanglements are; and one can say that an unfinished picture is realistic if each of its completions are. But even if disentanglements and completions match one for one, how we see the pictures will be quite different.” Fine’s metaphor of the unfinished picture is much like the metaphor of delineation stated above.
- 10.
In footnote 10 of 1975, Fine says that he is not sure that all material and mathematical entities are precise. However, he did not develop a theory about vague objects. So, when we say that Fine is a linguistic theorist on vagueness, we are referring to his supervaluationist view, not what his personal view might be.
- 11.
Not all precisifications are admissible. There are penumbral connections that any precisification should satisfy.
- 12.
Actually, mountains are not precise objects, but it is by no means obvious that there could not be precise mountains, and our view does not entail that there could not be such precise mountains. Thanks to an anonymous referee who brought this point to our attention.
- 13.
Here, an indeterminate world should not be identified with a world which is indeterminate considered as a whole. As Rosen and Smith (2004) argued, a world can be determinate as a whole even if it contains some indeterminacy. Rather, an indeterminate world, here, is just a world which contains some indeterminacies.
- 14.
The main idea does not entail that precisificational worlds be precise partial worlds. There may be higher-order vagueness, since being a precisificational world may be vague, too. Our proposal is not a reductive theory of ontic vagueness. Therefore, our view is not in conflict with the intuitive idea that vague objects do not divide the world into three precise regions. Thanks to an anonymous referee who brought this point to our attention.
- 15.
Here, Lewis might object that, based on his view, the best theory of counterfactuals must assume possible objects and based on his theory of modality, any possible object exists on a par with actual objects. So, since precisifications are possible, they exist. And the semantic view turns out to be more parsimonious again. Of course, he can argue this line. The objection, however, may have some force only if his theory of modality is true. Currently, his theory of modality is hard to swallow.
- 16.
However, it does reveal an important point: there is no necessary entailment from vague object to vague identity.
- 17.
This is Shoemaker’s own preference as ascribed in Cook (1986).
- 18.
After this stage, Evans complements his argument with a modal part. We are not concerned with it here, since the argument, as it will be argued, fails before it.
- 19.
- 20.
References
Akiba, K. (2004). Vagueness in the world. Noûs, 38, 407–429.
Barnes, E. (2009). Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts – Evans reconsidered. Synthese, 168, 81–96.
Barnes, E. (2010). Ontic vagueness: A guide for the perplexed. Noûs, 44(4), 601–627.
Cook, M. (1986). Indeterminacy of identity. Analysis, 46, 179–186.
Dummett, M. (1981). The interpretation of Frege’s philosophy. London: Duckworth.
Evans, G. (1978). Can there be vague objects? Analysis, 38(13), 208.
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese, 30, 265–300.
Garrett, B. J. (1988). Vagueness and identity. Analysis, 48, 130–134.
Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of vagueness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (1970). General semantics. Synthese, 22, 18–67.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1988). Vague identity: Evans misunderstood. Analysis, 48, 128–130.
Lewis, D. (1993). Many, but almost one. In K. Campbell, J. Bacon, & L. Reinhardt (Eds.), Ontology, causality, and mind: Essays on the philosophy of D. M. Armstrong (pp. 23–38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (1994). Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy. Analysis, 54, 110–114.
Noonan, H. W. (1982). Vague objects. Analysis, 42, 3–6.
Rasmussen, S. A. (1986). Vague identity. Mind, 95(377), 81–91.
Rosen, G., & Smith, N. J. J. (2004). Worldly indeterminacy: A rough guide. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, 185–198.
Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1, 84–92.
Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Thomason, R. (1982). Identity and vagueness. Philosophical Studies, 42, 329–332.
Tye, M. (1990). Vague objects. Mind, 99, 535–557.
Tye, M. (1996). Fuzzy realism and the problem of the many. Philosophical Studies, 81, 215–225.
Williams, J. R. G. (2008a). Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(230), 134–154.
Williams, J. R. G. (2008b). Ontic vagueness and metaphysical indeterminacy. Philosophy Compass, 3(4), 763–788.
Williams, R. (2008c). Supervaluationism and logical revisionism. Journal of Philosophy, 105(4), 192–212.
Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. Oxford: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Abasnezhad, A., Hosseini, D. (2014). Vagueness in the World: A Supervaluationist Approach. In: Akiba, K., Abasnezhad, A. (eds) Vague Objects and Vague Identity. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-7977-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-7978-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)