Abstract
In this chapter, I explain positive and negative liberty and the foundational ideas in liberalism as they relate to communitarianism and perfectionism. I explain the “social constitution thesis”— the idea that persons’ identities are socially constituted—a thesis to which some of Rawls’s critics are committed. This thesis serves as the basis for critics’ arguments that liberals are committed to an unacceptable metaphysical view of personal identity according to which persons’ identities are developed independently of society. This view is often called “abstract individualism.” I then explain why these objections have focused on Rawls’s liberal political theory and why critics claim he is committed to abstract individualism, and, thereby, a false conception of personal identity. I explain that critics claim that abstract individualism involves both metaphysical and normative commitments yielding metaphysical objections that concern Rawls’s conception of the person in the original position, and normative objections that concern Rawls’s political conception of the person, and are rooted in Rawls’s commitment to the priority of the right over the good. While these critics and their objections are often referred to as “communitarian,” I suggest that their concerns are more generally characterized as perfectionist.
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Notes
- 1.
I am thinking, for example, for the facts presented in MacKinnon’s (1985) famous argument in “Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech.” For a more recent overview of literature on pornography see Watson (2010) .
- 2.
Some liberal political theorists, for example Raz (1986) , as I’ll discuss later, actually fall in the other camp, so, strictly speaking, the label “liberal” is does not apply only to those who support negative liberty . But, for ease of discussion here, I’ll use liberal to mean only non-perfectionist liberals.
- 3.
I say things like the government ought to “ensure” and “intervene,” which are somewhat vague, because there are a great many questions here concerning how to properly characterize governmental action on perfectionist grounds. These issues will be dealt with in greater detail in the discussion of liberal neutrality in Chap. 3 and 7.
- 4.
Kymlicka (1988) , cf. Kymlicka (1989, p. 13) .
- 5.
Carse (1994, p. 184) .
- 6.
Jaggar (1983, p. 29) .
- 7.
In what follows, I use the term ‘personhood ’ to refer to the set of features, capacities or properties that are essential to being a person. In some cases, I take what others say about human nature to be about personhood. Human nature has been defined as “a quality or group of qualities belonging to all and only humans” (Schneewind 1995, p. 341) . Personhood is defined as the set of qualities that underwrite beings’ moral status has having rights (Johnson 1995 p. 513.). While a theory of human nature is broader than a conception of personhood, for my purposes, I suggest that it is acceptable to use them interchangeably because other writers on this topic seem to use the term ‘human nature’ to refer to those features that are essential to beings’ moral status, and those are the features that are relevant to my project.
- 8.
Rosenblum (1987, p. 161) .
- 9.
Ibid., p. 162.
- 10.
Kymlicka (1988, p. 181) .
- 11.
Kymlicka (1989, p. 1) .
- 12.
Ibid., p. 2. I note again that, though commentators have given Sandel and Taylor the communitarian label, neither explicitly accepts that label. As explained above, though, the concern here is not with the labels, rather, we are concerned with the extent to which their view exhibits the perfectionist view that the government ought to promote a particular conception of what is intrinsically valuable , and the fact that the reason for endorsing that view connects with personhood or personal identity .
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Appiah (2005, p. 47) .
- 15.
Sandel (1984, pp. 5-6) .
- 16.
MacIntyre (1984, p. 218) .
- 17.
Ibid., p. 220.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
For discussion of narrative identity and its relation to political theory, see Whitebrook (2001) .
- 21.
Sandel (1984, p. 5) .
- 22.
Taylor (1985, p. 205) .
- 23.
Ibid., p. 198.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 207.
- 25.
Jaggar (1983, p. 40) .
- 26.
Taylor (1989, p. 164) .
- 27.
In the literature on this topic, the phrase ‘conception of the good’ is used to refer to individuals’ conceptions of what is intrinsically valuable. Because these discussions also make reference to “the good,” by which they mean the common good of society. I will refer to conceptions of the good as ‘conceptions of what is intrinsically valuable’, or sometimes ‘conceptions of value’ for short.
- 28.
Taylor (1985, p. 189) .
- 29.
Ibid., p. 209.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Mulhall and Swift (1996, pp. 51-52) .
- 32.
Rawls (1985, pp. 239–40, 1996, p. 29).
- 33.
Hall (1994, p. 84) .
- 34.
Daniels (1979, p. 261) .
- 35.
Gutmann (1985, p. 313) .
- 36.
Ibid.
- 37.
Ibid., p. 314.
- 38.
Lukes (1973, p. 75) .
- 39.
Hall (1994, p. 79) .
- 40.
Rorty (1985, p. 217).
- 41.
Ibid.
- 42.
Rawls (1996, p. 29).
- 43.
Ibid., p. 93.
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
Hereafter, I refer to A Theory of Justice as ‘Theory’.
- 46.
Sandel (1998, p. 189) .
- 47.
Ibid., p. 192, quoting Rawls (1996, p. 30).
- 48.
Rawls (1985, pp. 230–1).
- 49.
Sandel (1998, p. 193) .
- 50.
Carse (1994, p. 196) .
- 51.
Rawls (1985, pp. 249–50).
- 52.
Kymlicka (1988, p. 173, 1989, p. 21) .
- 53.
Hampton (1989, p. 794) .
- 54.
Carse (1994, p. 203, n. 3) .
- 55.
Unger (1975, p. 193) .
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Campbell, C. (2014). Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory. In: Persons, Identity, and Political Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4_2
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