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Explanation as a Pragmatic Virtue: Bas van Fraassen’s Model

  • Margarita Santana
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 368)

Abstract

This work provides an analysis of van Fraassen’s model of explanation in the theoretical framework of the scientific explanation models. The objective is, first, to see his contribution to this framework and, secondly, what objections or criticism he is capable of. The analysis focuses, in this sense, in exposing the characterization that provides the explanation as a pragmatic virtue to determine if, indeed, the model proposed by van Fraassen, that is the first model to take elements as actors, contexts, and audiences into consideration, can be considered a pragmatic model of explanation. The aim is also to show that the theorisation of explanation incorporates underlying theorisations which determine the way in which explanation is conceptualised within each proposed model.

Keywords

Scientific explanation Models of explanation Explanation as a pragmatic virtue Contextual factors The pragmatics of explanation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of La LagunaLa LagunaSpain

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