A Panorama of Iterated Revision

Chapter
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 3)

Abstract

In 1985, David Makinson, together with Carlos Alchourron and Peter Gärdenfors published an article, the now renowned “AGM paper”, that gave rise to an entire new area of research: Belief Revision. The AGM paper set the stage for studying belief revision and provided the first fundamental results in the area. There was however one aspect of belief revision that was not addressed in the AGM paper: iterated belief revision. Since 1985, there have been numerous attempts to tackle this problem. In this chapter, we shall review some of the most influential approaches to the problem of iterated belief revision, and discuss their strengths and shortcomings.

Keywords

Belief revision Iterated revision Possible worlds 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, and to the editor of this book, Sven Ove Hansson, for his excellent work in coordinating our joint efforts. Since this book is devoted to David Makinson’s work, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to David for co-founding the area of Belief Revision that has constantly fueled my intellectual curiosity for over 20 years. More importantly though, I would like to thank David for setting such an inspiring example of a true scholar of the very best in academic traditions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of PatrasPatraGreece
  2. 2.Faculty of Engineering and ITUniversity of TechnologySydneyAustralia

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