Abstract
This chapter asks how a person’s knowledge is best understood in research in science education, given the approach to modelling mental processes in the science learner discussed earlier in the book. A distinction is made between the ideas a person experiences, and the system resources which allow them to have such ideas. Philosophical notions of knowledge as limited true, reasoned belief are considered to be unhelpful, as what we generally understand by knowledge in science education is far more inclusive. Researchers (and teachers) interested in student knowledge need to consider whatever beliefs a learner commits to (regardless of the grounds), and indeed whatever possibilities they may be entertaining and could go on to commit to: the range of notions under current consideration as possibly reflecting some aspect of how the world is. Taking knowledge to be represented in cognitive resources that support thinking suggests that much (thought certainly not all) knowledge of importance to learning science is of the form of implicit knowledge, not available to conscious introspection. This complicates the work of research intended to explore a learner’s knowledge of a topic.
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Taber, K.S. (2013). The Nature of the Learner’s Knowledge. In: Modelling Learners and Learning in Science Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7648-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7648-7_9
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