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Does ‘I’ Really Exist?

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Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems ((SSCNS,volume 9))

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Abstract

We are concerned here with a particular component of consciousness, its phenomenal aspect. This was already discussed in the previous two chapters (although mainly in Chap. 7), assuming it existed. The problem we now have to face is: does ‘I’ really exist or not?

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank D. Rosenthal, G. Edelman and B. Baars for helpful discussions on their approaches to consciousness.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, University of London, London, UK

    John G. Taylor

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  1. John G. Taylor
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Taylor, J.G. (2013). Does ‘I’ Really Exist?. In: Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_8

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