Abstract
Is each of us free to act in whatever way we wish at any time? Or instead are we completely controlled by our brain processes, so that there is no such freedom? Given the CODAM framework for supposedly explaining all of our conscious experience, how is our strong sense of having such freedom an illusion? How could such a strong belief arise? If not, where is the gap in a CODAM to let the freedom of will occur? These are questions to which it is natural to expect answers. The sense of freedom of the will is strong in all of us. We are often told “It is up to you” about some decision we have yet to make. We naturally expect to have this sense of freedom explained by any detailed model of experience.
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Taylor, J.G. (2013). Is There Free Will in CODAM?. In: Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness?. Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7645-6_16
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