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Improved Single-Key Attack on Reduced-Round LED

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 269)

Abstract

In this paper, On the basis of the single-key model and the differential analysis principle, we propose the improved attacks on the new low-cost LED block cipher which revisits meet-in-the-middle attack. More precisely, we choose a differential with high probability firstly. Since we have guessed some key nibbles to check whether the plaintext pair follows the differential characteristic, we construct the \( \delta \)-set from plaintext which is used to match the right key under meet-in-the-middle attack. Finally, the key candidates are recovered by removing the values that do not content conditions. Hence the secret key bits can be recovered with very low complexity 233, which is faster than other previous papers. We attack the complete six rounds on LED-64, and we can expand to more rounds on LED-128. At the present time, it is an efficient attack on six-rounds of LED-64.

Keywords

LED Meet-in-the-middle attack Block cipher Differential characteristic 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61272434), the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (No.ZR2011FQ032,ZR2012FM004), the Project of Shandong Province Higher Educational Science and Technology Program (No. J11LG33) and the project of Senior Visiting Scholar of Shandong Province (No.2011A115).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Information Science and EngineeringShandong Normal UniversityJinanChina
  2. 2.Weifang Business Vocational CollegeZhuchengChina

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