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Posthuman Subjectivity: Beyond Modern Metaphysics

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Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology

Part of the book series: Philosophy of Engineering and Technology ((POET,volume 14))

Abstract

This chapter explores the implications of posthumanist subjectivity via a discussion on subjectivity in the work of some important precursors of non-humanist posthumanism on subjectivity, such as Heidegger, Levinas and Deleuze, to methodological and radical posthumanists like Latour and Haraway. The human being is conceptualized here not as an independent and autonomous entity with clear cut boundaries but as a heterogeneous subject whose self-definition is continuously shifting, and that exists in a complex network of human and non-human agents and the technologies that mediate between them.

The discussion on subjectivity in the methodological and radical posthumanist approaches brings to light several significant shortcomings. Methodological posthumanism, after having argued for the agency of technological artifacts, too often fails to carry through the implications this has for human subjects. While radical posthumanism too often concedes to a celebration of hybridity (per se) and the claim that emerging biotechnologies have the potential to bring about a fundamental break with modernity. This critique serves as a platform to introduce the mediated posthumanist approach by reading Foucault’s work on subject constitution via the notion of technological mediation and extending his notion of “technologies of the self” to biotechnologies. In this reading, the subject is constituted in specific ways by its technological mediations with the world, but it also develops an active relation to them, so that technologies can be seen as ethical practices that an interconnected, dynamic and molecular subject works with to constitute itself.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See especially Discipline and Punish (1979a), A History of Sexuality, Vol. I (1979b), “Body/Power” (1980) and “Truth and Power” (1984). Foucault’s exploration is a continuation of Nietzsche’s focus on the body as the site of the subject’s social production and of Nietzsche’s genealogy as an analysis of the ways in which history affects or inscribes bodies. See “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1977).

  2. 2.

    Thus Foucault’s rallying cry for new forms of “bodies and pleasures” has inspired a number of projects that take the body as a source for political resistance, from sadomasochist practices to gay bodybuilding. On the other hand, a number of feminist critics have noted that Foucault seems to contradict himself here by first claiming that everything is historically constituted within power relations and then privileging some realm of the body as a transcendental source of transgression. This is namely in relation to his claim in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, that “bodies and pleasures” are the “rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality”, implying that bodies and pleasures are somehow “outside” the deployment of sexuality. For this critique, see especially Nancy Fraser (1989: 60), Elizabeth Grosz (1994: 155) and Judith Butler (1997).

  3. 3.

    More precisely, many poststructuralist philosophers depart from Heidegger to achieve a critical distance from him, some going as far as claiming that his critique of metaphysics is itself a repetition of an original metaphysical gesture, the gathering of thought to it its “proper” essence and vocation, see namely Derrida’s Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (1989). For theorists like Derrida, something even more original than Being, difference and alterity, is assumed but forgotten by the tradition. Still, Heidegger’s analysis of modern metaphysics as world picture is nonetheless a vital – if not radical enough – inspiration for poststructuralism.

  4. 4.

    Actor-network theory is a type of “material semiotics” – borrowing from semiotics the idea that signs have meaning only in relation to other signs.

  5. 5.

    For example, Pickering (2005) refers to a case reported about Asian eels that were imported to the US as pets for domestic aquariums, that soon began to grow rapidly, climb out of their tanks and invade local waterways. For Pickering, the interesting endeavor here is to think of the people and the Asian eels simultaneously. Not in isolation, but as bound up with one another in an evolving dialectic in which the people imported the eels, then the eels grew and climbed out of their tanks, then the people transferred the eels to the ponds, then the eels began to successfully compete with local fish, etc.

  6. 6.

    In this same essay Ihde explains further:

    Why post? Because, while a pragmatically bonded phenomenology retains the emphasis upon experience, there is neither anything like “a transcendental ego” nor a restriction to “consciousness”. Because a pragmatically bonded phenomenology evokes something like an “organism/environment” notion or interactionism, a notion I have repeatedly used as well. Because the relativity of pragmatist and phenomenological analyses (not relativism) is a dynamic style of analysis which does not and cannot claim “absolutes”, full “universality”, and which remains experimental and contingent. (136)

  7. 7.

    Examples of this are works of art that present aspects of the world that would be impossible to view without specific mediation. Verbeek discusses Wouter Hooijmans’ works, where landscape photos are taken using shutter times of several hours which exclude fleeting incidents – animals crossing the field of vision, movements of leaves, etc. – from the final take, creating a reality that is, so to speak, stripped bare of transient occurrences; a reality that does not exist before the camera generates it.

  8. 8.

    Verbeek’s (2011) attempt to develop an account of a mediated, ethical subject is exceptional in this sense, and I will return to his adoption of Foucault in this context later on.

  9. 9.

    Structuralist theory already had unsettling implications for the notion of the autonomous subject. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963), in his adoption of de Saussure’s linguistic model to anthropology, argued that if all of culture is structured like language, than meaning is reducible to a system of differences, and along with meaning, agency and history are reduced to consequences of structure.

  10. 10.

    Lacan’s work can be seen as a reaction to the tendency towards an “ego psychology” developed in post-Freudian psychoanalysis. In an amusing reworking of the Cogito he writes: “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think … I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think”. (1977: 166)

  11. 11.

    Of course, numerous other postmodern theorists and their analyses of modern and postmodern subjectivity could be cited here. Jean Baudrillard (1983b) claims that subjects have imploded into the masses and that in the postmodern media and information society subjects are no more than “a term in a terminal” (1983a); KroKer and Cook (1988) view the subject as a cyberneticized effect of systems of control; and Frederic Jameson (1984) argues that the postmodern subject is no longer bounded, centered or has any psychic depth.

  12. 12.

    Feminist and postcolonial theory, more than any other offshoots of poststructuralism, have argued that what masquerades as universal subjectivity has been reserved for white European males.

  13. 13.

    Extending Levinas’ ethics of obligation towards the alterity of the other, in Of Hospitality (2000) Derrida posits hospitality as the name for our relation to the other, the very principle of ethics. For Derrida, the notion of hospitality includes two types of hospitality, “general” and “unconditional” hospitality. General hospitality makes claims to property ownership and the desire to a form of self-identity. It implies that, in order to be hospitable, one must first have the power to host, i.e., one must be the “master” of one’s house (country or nation); general hospitality assumes a necessary degree of control over the situation. Unconditional, or absolute hospitality, on the other hand, demands a welcoming of whomever, or whatever, may be in need of hospitality, hence involving a relinquishing of control in regard to who will receive that hospitality. This hospitality necessitates a “non-mastery” and the abandoning of all claims to property or ownership. According to Derrida, the unconditional form of hospitality is near impossible to enact, but, nonetheless, the idea of hospitality is inconceivable without it. The co-existence of these two different and conflicting notions of hospitality gives rise to an aporia, an internal tension that is precisely, he claims, what keeps the concept of hospitality alive.

  14. 14.

    Doyle associates such iteration of differing identities with William S. Burroughs’ musings on cloning and the ego in “Immortality” (1993). For Burroughs, cloning offers the possibility of multiplying and distributing identity, of deterritorializing the self and scattering it among various bodies. Rather than giving significance to the ego, he views it as the end of the ego:

    What we think of as our ego is defensive reaction, just as the symptoms of an illness-fever, swelling, sweating – are the body’s reaction to an invading organism. Our beloved ego, arising from the rotten weeds of lust and fear and anger, has no more continuity than a fever sweat. There is no ego; only a shifting process… When I first heard about cloning I thought, what a fruitful concept: why, one could be in a hundred different places at once and experience everything the other clones did. I am amazed at the outcry against this good thing not only from men of the cloth but also from scientists, the very scientists whose patient research has brought cloning within our grasp. The very thought of a clone disturbs these gentlemen. Like cattle on the verge of stampede [sic], they paw at the ground mooing apprehensively. “Selfness is an essential fact of life. The thought of human selfness is terrifying”. … Terrifying to whom? Speak for yourself. (132)

  15. 15.

    The critique that digital technologies betray a desire to transcend the body in favor of pure, disembodied information is by now common. See Braidotti (1994, 2002), Hayles (1999) and Ihde (2002), and for a more general engagement with the significance of embodiment, Butler (1993), Grosz (1994), Lingis (1994), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

  16. 16.

    Though, it is precisely against such a reading of uploading that Doyle argues. “Uploading”, he contends, “is an anticipation of precisely ‘more life’, life not free of the body but distributed into spaces not yet visible … Addicted to contingency, or prowling for mastery, uploaded subjects mark out the materiality and possibility of the new flesh, anticipated flesh that is something other than either transcendental or meatless” (2003: 142).

  17. 17.

    Some even claim that the many assumptions of subject reformulation in postmodern thought realign it with preexisting arguments that valorize masculine transcendence of matter as a feminine and inferior principle. See Somer Brodribb’s Nothing Matters: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism (1992).

  18. 18.

    Kirby’s critique is in line with Deleuze’s attempt to rethink difference not as difference from but difference in itself, as well as the difficulty of this endeavor.

  19. 19.

    In Chapter 2, this problem manifested itself in radical posthumanism’s positioning on both the historical and the ontological poles of the second axis of differentiation.

  20. 20.

    Hardt and Negri’s main protagonist is the “multitude”, but I am here interested in their discussion of the posthuman figure who uses technoscience to resist Empire.

  21. 21.

    They also insist that the actualization of terrains of potential metamorphosis requires new productive/labor practices, rather than cyborg “fables”.

  22. 22.

    Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova (2000), in their analysis of the shift from “discipline” to “control” and its investment in the body, put this even more bluntly:

    Even as discipline was being successfully exported through outsourcing from the West, the relief for its decline was palpable in the early stages of postmodern theory. The latter got drunk on its glimpses of a different age, one based on proliferation, fragmentation, and fluidity and forgot that discipline was a historical formation not the ultimate form of power. Postmodern theory was weak in its understandings of modes of power which did not operate by enclosure, individuation and hierarchy and sometimes misunderstood the collapse of discipline for the end of power as such. (15)

  23. 23.

    To the extent that technologies of the self can be separated from technologies of power. For Foucault all four technologies are at work simultaneously.

  24. 24.

    In “Foucault as Virtue Ethicist”, Neil Levy (2004) claims that insofar as virtue ethics’ main thesis is that modern ethics has placed too much emphasis on rules, duties and consequences, when the core of ethics should be the character of the moral agent, it can be seen as a parallel project to Foucault’s.

  25. 25.

    It also marks, at least since the Enlightenment, an inextricable link between the demand to know yourself, to access your inner truth, and the constitution of subjects who can be governed.

  26. 26.

    This echoes Nietzsche’s work on morality, in which human beings are also, in a natural state, governed by impulses and passions (as manifestations of the will to power). The essence of morality for Nietzsche is the aim of disciplining, mastering these drives, of transcending the merely given. Morality is not about the repudiation or abnegation of these impulses, but about sublimating them, about giving “order to the chaos” by stylizing one’s character and self-overcoming.

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Sharon, T. (2014). Posthuman Subjectivity: Beyond Modern Metaphysics. In: Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7554-1_6

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