Abstract
In this Chap. I conducted an examination and analysis of the findings from the quantitative component of this research with respect to a sample of tax evaders (non-compliant taxpayers) drawn from the data bases of the ATO. That is, those tax evaders who were audited and penalised by the ATO for non-compliance during the period 2004–2006 formed the sample frame, with those who responded via a mail survey being recorded.
Initially a brief examination of the demographic profile of the tax evader sample was conducted followed by a detailed descriptive analysis of the sample in terms of frequencies and percentage breakdowns of selected survey questions, representing the primary research questions posed (PRQ1 to PRQ6—Table 4.1). The data analysis employed Chi-square statistical tests which investigated the relationship, if any, between selected key compliance variables and compliance behaviour. Following this a factor analysis and logistic regression was conducted which tested the strength of these relationships, if any. Graphs illustrating significant statistical results for five factors including; positive law enforcement, probability of detection, tax morals, monetary penalty v education and community service v prison sentence, are also presented. The major findings of the quantitative analysis suggest that tax fairness, tax morals and to a lesser degree, tax law enforcement and detection had an influence upon the compliance behaviour of tax evaders.
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Notes
- 1.
With the assistance of Assistant Commissioner Chris Mobbs, a sample of tax evaders based on specific selection criteria was drawn from the broader adjusted evader population in June 2007.
- 2.
McKerchar (2003, p. 103). For example, the requirement to quote a tax file number (TFN) to a bank, or to provide an employment declaration (including your TFN) to an employer, in order to minimise the amount of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) tax that must be withheld from payments of interest or wages. However, it is noted that those taxpayers who operate in the cash economy may arguably be significant in number.
- 3.
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
The majority of the Australian population earned between $ 30,000 and $ 80,000 per annum in 2006. See www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@nsf.
- 6.
ABS statistics show that this bracket of taxpayers is the dominant age grouping. See www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@nsf.
- 7.
See, for example, Birch et al. (2003); Gilligan and Richardson (2005, pp. 1–13); Wallschutzky (1984, pp. 371–384) and Tan (1998, pp. 59–71).
- 8.
The ATO confirmed that all taxpayers in the sample had been audited and penalised.
- 9.
Kinsey (1986, pp. 403–425).
- 10.
See Karlinsky et al. (2004, pp. 226–240) and Gupta (2007).
- 11.
Hite (1997, pp. 155–180).
- 12.
See for example, James and Alley (1999, pp. 3–14).
- 13.
See, for example, in the Mongolian Tax Office with respect to Value Added Tax (VAT), where if a taxpayer has been shown as compliant they are entitled to prompt refunds each period without a full audit prior to payment of the refund. The refund is guaranteed within two or three weeks of filing the return. See < http://www.mta.mn > Mongolian Tax Authority publishes VAT for Small and Medium Enterprises.
- 14.
See for example, Niemirowski and Mobbs (2002).
- 15.
See Cialdini (1989).
- 16.
Pallent (2005, p. 288).
- 17.
For chi-square non-parametric statistical test for independence a 0.05 level of significance is appropriate as opposed to some more stringent parametric tests where a significance level of 0.01 is required. See Pallant (2005, p. 290). A 0.05 level of significance also allowed for more flexibility in the ascertainment of any relationship between the variables investigated.
- 18.
Refer to Table 5.1.
- 19.
O’Connell (2006, p. 11).
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
Refer Table 5.1.
- 22.
Catell (1966, pp. 245–276).
- 23.
Hair et al. (1998).
- 24.
Thurstone (1947).
- 25.
See Table 5.15 above.
- 26.
See Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 132) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 161).
- 27.
Thurstone (1947).
- 28.
See James and Alley (1999, pp. 3–14).
- 29.
See Table 5.15.
- 30.
Pallent (2005, p. 175).
- 31.
See Wallschutzky (1984); Alm et al. (1992); Wearing and Headley (1997, pp. 3–17) and Tan (1998, p. 11). See also a review of Australian Tax Policy by the Asprey Committee which regarded fairness as the most universally sought-after quality in a tax system.
- 32.
See Smith (1990, pp. 350–369); Robben et al. (1990, pp. 545–567) and Torgler and Murphy (2004, p. 99).
- 33.
See Fig. 3.5 and the discussion regarding the application of deterrent measures on influential taxpayers.
- 34.
See Torgler and Murphy (2004).
- 35.
See Mason and Calvin (1978, pp. 489–496) and Johnson (2003, p. 1013).
- 36.
See Tittle and Logan (1973, pp. 371–389).
- 37.
See Mason and Calvin (1978, pp. 73–89).
- 38.
Zimring and Hawkins (1973).
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Devos, K. (2014). Quantitative Analysis of Research Findings—Evader Sample. In: Factors Influencing Individual Taxpayer Compliance Behaviour. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7476-6_5
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