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Abstract

This study investigated whether or not there was a relationship between selected tax compliance variables (both economic and non-economic) and the attitudes and behaviour of Australian individual taxpayers. Major findings indicated that tax morals and to a lesser degree, tax fairness, tax law enforcement, tax awareness, gender, education and income level, directly and indirectly influence compliance behaviour. These findings lead to a number of tax policy implications including; the adoption of a tax morale approach to compliance by the revenue authority, specifically addressing issues of both horizontal and exchange inequity and improving enforcement and audit measures while balancing this with greater media exposure to increase deterrence. While this study revealed many interesting and important insights into the factors which influence compliance, the work has potential for future expansion through the investigation of other compliance variables, other players in the tax system (e.g. the tax authorities and tax practitioners) and also through an investigation of other jurisdictions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    McKerchar (2003, p. 201).

  2. 2.

    Ibid 202.

  3. 3.

    Ibid 203.

  4. 4.

    See Sect. 9.5.1 in Chap. 9.

  5. 5.

    See Sect. 9.4.3.

  6. 6.

    See Fig. 2.2 in Chap. 2.

  7. 7.

    Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 181–182).

  8. 8.

    These were high profile taxpayers who were prosecuted for tax fraud (Skase in the mid 1990’s and Wheatley in 2007) and arguably made an example of to the general public in an attempt to increase general deterrence.

  9. 9.

    See Smith (1992), Sheffrin and Triest (1992).

  10. 10.

    For the effect of social norms on compliance behaviour see Torgler and Murphy (2004).

  11. 11.

    McKerchar (2003, p. 210). It is noted that the ATO has introduced a standard deduction and greater pre-filling of returns effective from the 2011–2012 tax year, based on recommendations of the Henry Tax Review, 2010.

  12. 12.

    See Murphy (2004, pp. 187–209).

  13. 13.

    Kornhauser (2007, pp. 599–632).

  14. 14.

    See Tyler et al. cited in Smart (1999), regarding the procedural justice literature.

  15. 15.

    Kornhauser (2007, pp. 599–632).

  16. 16.

    Ibid 626.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Wenzel (2007, pp. 31–50).

  19. 19.

    McKerchar (2003, p. 208). The Taxpayers charter is available at the ATO web site at http://www.ato.gov.au. It details the rights and obligations of both taxpayers and the ATO. See also the ATO Compliance Model—Appendix A.

  20. 20.

    See Hite and Roberts (1992, pp. 115–137), Chan (2000), Tan (1998, pp. 59–71).

  21. 21.

    McKerchar (2003, p. 208).

  22. 22.

    James et al. (2005, pp. 157–188).

  23. 23.

    See Hite (1997, pp. 155–180).

  24. 24.

    McKerchar (2003, p. 211).

  25. 25.

    See for example, Alm et al. (1992, pp. 285–303), Wearing and Headley (1997, pp. 3–17).

  26. 26.

    BAS (Business Activity Statements).

  27. 27.

    See the Australian National Audit Office Report No. 34, 2008–09, Australian Taxation Office, Management of Serious Non-Compliance, 58–59.

  28. 28.

    See for example Hite (1997).

  29. 29.

    ANAO (2008–2009, pp. 62–66).

  30. 30.

    See Wickerson (1994) also Jackson and Jaouen (1989, p. 131).

  31. 31.

    ANAO (2008–2009, pp. 58–59).

  32. 32.

    See Hite (1997).

  33. 33.

    Portuguese Tax Authorities publish a list of debtors, and their categorisation, in accordance with the amount of the debt, on their website <http://www.e-financas.gov.pt/de/pubdiv/de-devedores.html>. In April 2010, the Portuguese Government officially announced that it had recovered more than a thousand million Euros due to publication of the list of taxpayers (individuals and corporations) with tax debts.

  34. 34.

    The reintegration shaming literature, see for example, J, Braithwaite, “Crime, Shame and Reintegration; Braithwaite and Drahos (2002, pp. 269–288), where it was concluded that naming and shaming was a bad policy for the powerless but could be a strategic policy with regards to corporate or organisational crime. See also Van Erp (2010), where it was found that exposing the offender raises the expectation of a moral message about the inappropriateness of certain behaviour. The Study showed that regulatory enforcement provides an opportunity to express what is morally right and to change perceptions as to what is meant by appropriate behaviour.

  35. 35.

    See James and Alley (1999, pp. 3–14), Noble (2002, p. 22).

  36. 36.

    See McKerchar (2003, p. 213), where the study of complexity in taxpayer compliance did make a significant contribution to the understanding of compliance behaviour as a whole.

  37. 37.

    See Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 255).

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Correspondence to Ken Devos .

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© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Devos, K. (2014). Conclusion. In: Factors Influencing Individual Taxpayer Compliance Behaviour. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7476-6_10

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