Abstract
Much of the literature in economics on household decision-making assumes (either explicitly or implicitly) that the household maximizes a unique utility function given a set of constraints dictated by the household budget and the available domestic production technology. This approach treats the resource allocation mechanism in the household as a “black box” (or more precisely as a single homogeneous unit); it has the virtue of simplicity and convenience in explaining household behavior, but in many ways it contradicts the essence of micro-economic theory which stresses that the behaviors of individuals are characterized by their own preferences. Aggregating a group of individuals into a household hence involves invoking assumptions that are neither theoretically appealing nor empirically applicable in dealing with the intra-household resource allocation decision-making.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Although there are several contexts in the bargaining model, in the discussion of several persons in a household, the bargaining process could be represented by this product type, and this model could be a general form of the household bargaining process.
- 2.
The PSFD started from the “core respondents” survey (prefixed by R), and extended to the respondents’ parents (prefixed by P), children (prefixed by C), and siblings (prefixed by S).
- 3.
The PSFD provides over 12 categories of educational levels; we transformed each category to years of education; we used the same method when analyzing the TSCS data (below).
- 4.
The “Relationship between couples” scores are from 1 to 5; 1 is the worst and 5 is the best.
- 5.
The PSFD asked the respondent: how did you meet your spouse and get married? We separated the case that relatives or parents play as match-maker from the case of love-match to marry.
- 6.
Satisfaction of marriage in TSCS is categorized into four levels as very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied. Most respondents report very satisfied and satisfied, so we separated very satisfied from the others.
References
Becker, G. S. (1993). A treatise on the family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., & Thomas, D. (2001). Bargaining power within couples and use of prenatal and delivery care in Indonesia. Studies in Family Planning, 32(2), 130–146.
Behrman, J. R. (1996). Intrahousehold distribution and the family. In M. R. Rosenzweig & O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of population and family economics (pp. 125–187). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Bjorn, P. A. & Vuong, Q. H. (1985). Econometric modelling of a Stackelberg game with an application to labor force participation. Working paper. California Institute of Technology.
Bourguignon, F., Browning, M., Chiappori, P. A., & Lechene, V. (1993). Intrahousehold allocation of consumption: Some evidence on French data. Annales d’Economie et de Statistiques, 29, 137–156.
Browning, M., Bouguignon, F., Chiappori, P. A., & Lechene V. (1993). Incomes and outcomes: A structural model of intra-household allocation. Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1067–1096.
Chen, C.-L. (1997). Intra-household resource allocation – Evidence from Taiwanese household survey. The National Chi-Nan University Journal, 1(1), 195–236. in Chinese.
Chen, C.-L. (2004). Mechanism of resources allocation decision-making between the couple and the effects on childrearing and education. Research in Applied Psychology, 24, 65–93. in Chinese.
Chiappori, P. A. A. (1988). Rational household labor supply. Econometrica, 56(1), 63–89.
Chiappori, P. A. A. (1992). Collective labour supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), 437–467.
Chu, C. Y. C., Chung, C. -F., Wang, C. -N., & Yu, R. -R. (2001). The decision ‘power’ in endogenously – Formed families. Paper presented to the Conference on Panel Study of Family Dynamics, Taipei.
Gallin, R. S. (1986). Mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law: Intergenerational relations within the Chinese family in Taiwan. Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology, 1(1), 31–49.
Kung, H.-M. (1999). Intergenerational interaction between mothers- and daughters-in-law: A qualitative study. Applied Psychological Research, 4, 57–96 (in Chinese).
Lundberg, S. J., & Pollak, R. A. (1993). Separate spheres bargaining models of marriage. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 988–1011.
Lundberg, S. J., Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1997). Do husbands and wives pool their resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom child benefit. The Journal of Human Resources, 32(3), 463–480.
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and household decision making: A bargaining analysis. International Economic Review, 21(1), 31–44.
McElroy, M. B. (1990). The empirical content of Nash-bargained household behavior. Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 1–57.
McElroy, M. B. (1991). Nash-bargained household decisions: Reply. International Economic Review, 31, 237.
McElroy, M. B., & Horney, M. J. (1981). Nash-bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. International Economic Review, 22, 333–347.
Quisumbing, A. R. (1994). Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender differences in traditional inheritance customs. Journal of Development Economics, 43, 167.
Schultz, T. P. (1990). Testing the neoclassical model of family labor supply and fertility. Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 599–634.
Strauss, J., & Thomas, D. (1996). Human resources: Empirical modeling of household and family decisions. In T. N. Srinivansan, & J. Behrman (Eds.), Handbook of development economics (Vol. III, pp. 1883–2024). Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Tan, L.-T., & Yu, R.-R. (1995). Labor supply of nuclear family in Taiwan – Application of Nash bargaining family decision-making model. Academia Economic Papers, 23(3), 299–334 (in Chinese).
Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach. Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 635–664.
Thomas, D. (1993). The distribution of income and expenditure within the household. Annales de Economie et de Statistiques, 29, 109–136.
Thomas, D., Contreras, D., & Frankenberg, E. (1999). Child health and the distribution of household resources at marriage. Unpublished paper, Santa Monica: RAND.
Ulph, D. T. (1989). A general non-cooperative Nash model of household consumption behaviour. Mimeo: Bristol University.
Wolf, M. (1972). Women and the family in rural Taiwan. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Yi, C. -C.. (1999). The transition of family structure and female’s domestic status in Taiwan. Paper presented to the Transitional Societies in Comparison: Central East Europe versus Taiwan, Prague.
Yi, C. -C., & Chen, Y. -H. (2001). Developing more equal relations within the household: A comparison of Taiwan and China. Paper presented to the 2001 Hong Kong International Convention: Globalization and Its Challenges in the 21st Century, Hong Kong.
Yi, C.-C., & Yang, W.-S. (1995). The perceived conflict and decision making patterns among husbands and wives in Taiwan. In Family formation and dissolution: Perspectives from East and West (pp. 129–168). Taipei: Academia Sinica.
Yi, C. -C., Lu, Y. -H., & Chen, Y. -H. (1998a). Study on women’s status in the family: Patterns of decision-making as an example. Project Accomplishment of Social Science Division of National Science Council, Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica in Taipei (in Chinese).
Yi, C. -C., Lu, Y. -H., & Pan, Y. -K. (1998b). Female’s family status: A comparison of the family power structure in Taiwan and Mainland China. Paper presented to the XIV World Congress of Sociology on Social Knowledge: Heritage, Challenges, Perspectives, International Sociological Association, Montreal.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Chen, CL. (2014). Models of Resource Distribution in the Family in Taiwan. In: Poston, Jr., D., Yang, W., Farris, D. (eds) The Family and Social Change in Chinese Societies. The Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7445-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7445-2_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-7444-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-7445-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawSocial Sciences (R0)