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Class Action Lawsuits in Europe: A Comparative and Economic Analysis

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Law and Economics in Europe

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 1))

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Abstract

In this essay I would like to outline and analyse various options for structuring a class action lawsuit . First, I will examine the form of class action lawsuit that is best known internationally, the United States of American class action, with a view to showing the extent to which its negative impacts are linked to particular institutions of US law. I will proceed to examine European forms of collective legal protection that are thought to be appropriate to today’s needs. The subsequent economic analysis sets out to evaluate the different possible structures for class action lawsuits with reference to the goal of economic efficiency .

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 20.

  2. 2.

    Wagner, p. 52.

  3. 3.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 20.

  4. 4.

    Wagner, p. 54.

  5. 5.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 18.

  6. 6.

    Eichholtz, p. 10.

  7. 7.

    Droese, p. 121.

  8. 8.

    Batten, pp. 440 et seq.

  9. 9.

    Hohl, pp. 23 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Batten, pp. 440 et seq.

  11. 11.

    Hohl, p. 50.

  12. 12.

    Fritz, pp. 9 et seqq.

  13. 13.

    Mörsdorf-Schulte, p. 297.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Sutter-Somm, nos. 436 et seq.

  15. 15.

    Baudenacher, pp. 173 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    Neufang, p. 31.

  17. 17.

    Adams , Ökonomische Theorie, p. 349; cf. Adams , ‘The Conflict’, pp. 53 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    Shavell , pp. 429 et seqq.

  19. 19.

    Böhm, p. 68.

  20. 20.

    Neufang, p. 31.

  21. 21.

    Böhm, p. 68.

  22. 22.

    Neufang, p. 31.

  23. 23.

    Shavell , pp. 435 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Janssen, p. 6 et seq.

  25. 25.

    Michailidou, p. 234.

  26. 26.

    Hess, p. 2331.

  27. 27.

    Dahm-Loraing and Speer, p. 16.

  28. 28.

    Cf. <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kapmug/BJNR243710005.html>.

  29. 29.

    Dahm-Loraing and Speer, p. 16.

  30. 30.

    Dahm-Loraing and Speer, p. 8.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Droese, p. 127.

  32. 32.

    Droese, p. 129.

  33. 33.

    Harbour and Shelley, p. 28.

  34. 34.

    Mattil and Desoutter, ‘EC Law’, p. 485.

  35. 35.

    Proposition 2001/02:1070064, 8.

  36. 36.

    Cf. Harbour and Shelley, p. 27.

  37. 37.

    KOM(2007) 99 final, 03.03.2007.

  38. 38.

    KOM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005.

  39. 39.

    KOM(2008) 165 final, 02.04.2008.

  40. 40.

    White Paper, pp. 4 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Green Paper, p. 11.

  42. 42.

    M.w.V. Janssen, p. 12.

  43. 43.

    <http://www.muenchen.ihk.de/mike/ihk_geschaeftsfelder/recht/Vertragsrecht/EU-Sammelklagen.html>.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Janssen, p. 13.

  45. 45.

    Green Paper, p. 15.

  46. 46.

    Janssen, p. 13.

  47. 47.

    Green Paper, p. 16.

  48. 48.

    Mattil und Desoutter, ‘Sammelklage’, p. 526.

  49. 49.

    Mathis, Efficiency, pp. 204 et seq.

  50. 50.

    Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, p. 4.

  51. 51.

    Bundesministerium des Innern, Der Mandelkern-Bericht – Auf dem Weg zu besseren Gesetzen. See also: Andrea Hanisch, Institutionenökonomische Ansätze in der Folgenabschätzung der Europäischen Kommission.

  52. 52.

    Cf. Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, pp. 3 et seq.

  53. 53.

    Cf. Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, p. 6.

  54. 54.

    Coleman, p. 16; cf. Mathis, Efficiency , p. 78.

  55. 55.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1383.

  56. 56.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1385.

  57. 57.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1383 et seq.

  58. 58.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 26.

  59. 59.

    Scottish Law Commission, Multi-Party Actions, Report under a reference under section 3(1) (e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965, Edinburgh 1996, No. 154, p. 42, <http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/rep154.pdf> (viewed 14 September 2010).

  60. 60.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 26.

  61. 61.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 27.

  62. 62.

    Bohn and Choi, p. 903.

  63. 63.

    Piker-Hörmann and Kolba, pp. 199 et seq.

  64. 64.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 27.

  65. 65.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 22.

  66. 66.

    Eisberg and Miller, p. 27.

  67. 67.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 24.

  68. 68.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 24.

  69. 69.

    Cf. Eisenberg and Miller, p. 1 et seqq.

  70. 70.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 25.

  71. 71.

    Renda et~al., Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU; welfare impact and potential scenarios, Report for the European Commission, 2008, <http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf> (viewed 14 September 2010).

  72. 72.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 25.

  73. 73.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 26.

  74. 74.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1390.

  75. 75.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 29.

  76. 76.

    Schäfer, pp. 192 et seq.

  77. 77.

    Bebchuck and Guzman, p. 53 quoted after Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 30.

  78. 78.

    Rosenberg and Shavell , p. 3.

  79. 79.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1392.

  80. 80.

    Hay and Rosenberg , pp. 1391 et seq.

  81. 81.

    Hay and Rosenberg , p. 1392.

  82. 82.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 31.

  83. 83.

    In re Rohne-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).

  84. 84.

    Cf. also Hay and Rosenberg , pp. 1391 et seq.

  85. 85.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 28.

  86. 86.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 32.

  87. 87.

    Cf. § 8 KapMuG (2007).

  88. 88.

    Hirschman.

  89. 89.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 33.

  90. 90.

    Choi, p. 1465.

  91. 91.

    Resnik, p. 835.

  92. 92.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 33.

  93. 93.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 34.

  94. 94.

    Cf. Droese, pp. 132 et seq.

  95. 95.

    Van den Bergh and Keske, p. 40.

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Dawidowicz, R. (2014). Class Action Lawsuits in Europe: A Comparative and Economic Analysis. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_10

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