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Additionality of Climate Change Mitigation Activities

  • Gregory Valatin
Chapter
Part of the Forestry Sciences book series (FOSC, volume 81)

Abstract

Although widely considered to be a core aspect of quality assurance of climate change mitigation activities, additionality remains a source of much controversy in relation to carbon accounting and carbon markets. This chapter illuminates the multi-faceted nature of the concept and develops a taxonomy of different forms. It provides an overview of how additionality is currently applied in relation to both compliance and voluntary carbon markets, including tests used and underlying evidence base requirements. This draws upon and updates an earlier review commissioned to help inform development of a Woodland Carbon Code designed to underpin climate change mitigation activities in the UK by the forest sector. Sources of uncertainty and trade-offs in practical application of the concept are highlighted, and potential perverse incentives explored.

Keywords

Clean Development Mechanism Clean Development Mechanism Project Carbon Credit Project Developer Perverse Incentive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

 Thanks to Pat Snowdon, Chris Quine and Trevor Fenning for their comments, to Christine Cahalan and three anonymous reviewers.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Forest ResearchNorthern Research StationMidlothianScotland, UK

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