Pluralism Towards Pluralism
In this chapter we visit the subtle question of whether the pluralist is pluralist towards himself. We answer this question in two ways. The first is technical, and we develop this answer in Sects. 11.2 and 11.3. The second answer is general, and we develop this answer in Sect. 11.4. A reader could skip Sects. 11.2 and 11.3 without loss of coherence, especially if said reader is not wedded to a particular formal paraconsistent logic. The final two sections are for those who feel queasy from following the conceptual gymnastics of pluralism.
KeywordsTrivial Theory Paraconsistent Logic Coherent Interpretation Public Philosopher Contradictory Object
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