Abstract
Models using rational choice and game theory as their starting point for the study of social norms are reviewed. Two models exploring how cooperation is possible under the assumption of the rationality of human decision-making are discussed. This approach largely relies on deterrence and the difference between centralized and distributed punishment is discussed.
The measure of a man’s character is what he would do if he knew he never would be found out. Thomas Babington Macaulay
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Elsenbroich, C., Gilbert, N. (2014). Punishment and Social Norms. In: Modelling Norms. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_6
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