Contraction, Revision, Expansion: Representing Belief Change Operations

  • Sven Ove Hansson
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 1)


The underlying idealizations in Krister Segerberg’s Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) are investigated in comparison with other belief revision models. It is argued that the doxastic voluntarism of the proposed interpretation is problematic but can be discarded. The treatment of conditional operators in DDL is discussed, and it is proposed that the use of conditional operators not satisfying the Ramsey test should be further investigated.


Belief Revision Belief State Belief Change Conditional Belief Conditional Sentence 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)StockholmSweden

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