The Concept of a Routine in Segerberg’s Philosophy of Action

  • Dag Elgesem
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 1)


The notion of a routine for acting plays a fundamental role in Krister Segeberg’s philosophy of action and he uses it in a series of papers as the basis for the formulation of logics of intentional action. The present chapter is an attempt to provide a critical assessment of Segerberg’s program. First, an exposition of the central elements of Segerberg’s account of routines is given and its roles in his philosophy of action are discussed. It is argued that Segerberg’s notion of routines provides a very productive perspective on intentional agency and that it gives rise to a series of challenges to attempts to construct logics of intentional action. It is then argued that Segerberg’s own formal theories of intentional action do not fully meet these challenges. Finally, it is suggested a way in which the challenges can be met if the concept of a routine is brought explicitly into the semantic framework for the logic of intentions and actions.


Actions Agency Intentions Intentional action Routines Action theory Action logic 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BergenBergenNorway

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