Auction Based Ticket Selling Schemes with Multiple Demand from the Agents in Static Environment

  • Sajal Mukhopadhyay
  • D. Ghosh
  • Narayan C. Debnath
  • N. RamTeja
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 253)


First-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheme is used for selling the tickets in ticket market that is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In earlier literature it has been shown that the auction based alternative solutions using the framework of mechanism design, a sub field of game theory, can provide better results against FCFS in terms of profit making and efficiency in allocation. However the solution proposed in the earlier literature can address the ticket selling environment where an agent can give demand for a single ticket in static environment. In many situations a single agent can give demand for multiple tickets in static environment. In this paper, with the use of mechanism design framework some elegant solutions are proposed in static environment where an agent can give demand for multiple tickets.


Ticket market Static environment Mechanism design Multiple demand 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sajal Mukhopadhyay
    • 1
  • D. Ghosh
    • 2
  • Narayan C. Debnath
    • 3
  • N. RamTeja
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information TechnologyNational Institute of TechnologyDurgapurIndia
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringNational Institute of TechnologyDurgapurIndia
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceWinona State UniversityWinonaUSA

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