Advertisement

On Law, Philosophy and Technology

  • Ugo Pagallo
Chapter
Part of the Law, Governance and Technology Series book series (LGTS, volume 10)

Abstract

What a new generation of issues concerning robotic crimes, contracts, and torts have in common is the legal quest to define who is responsible for a robotic act or omission: when something goes wrong, “Who Pays?” Lawyers accordingly determine different levels of responsibility and agency in the field of legal robotics, by ascertaining whether such autonomous and even “intelligent” machines should be reckoned as legal persons, proper agents, or mere sources of legal responsibility in the system. Three different scenarios for a hard case in positive law concern the personhood of robots, their accountability in contracts, and new types of human responsibility for the behaviour of others. However, “Who pays?” often means different things in such fields as criminal law, contracts, and torts, e.g., the level of robotic autonomy that at times is sufficient to produce relevant effects in the field of contractual obligations, arguably is insufficient to bring robots before judges and have them declared guilty in criminal courts.

Keywords

Artificial Agent Legal Personhood Legal Reasoning Legal Responsibility Strict Liability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Allen, Colin, Gary Varner, and Jason Zinser. 2000. Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12: 251–261.Google Scholar
  2. Arkin, Ronald C. 2007. Governing lethal behaviour: Embedding ethics in a hybrid deliberative/hybrid robot architecture, Report GIT-GVU-07-11, Georgia Institute of Technology’s GVU Center, Atlanta, GA.Google Scholar
  3. Asimov, Isaac. 1985. Robots and empire. New York: Doubleday.Google Scholar
  4. Asimov, Isaac. 1995. The complete robot: The definitive collection of robot stories. London: Harper Collins.Google Scholar
  5. Bartneck, Christoph, Juliane Reichenbach, and Julie Carpenter. 2006. Use of praise and punishment in human-robot collaborative teams. In Proceedings of the RO-MAN 2006 – The 15th IEEE international symposium on robot and human interactive communication, Hatfield.Google Scholar
  6. Chopra, Samir, and Laurence F. White. 2011. A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  7. Clarke, Roger. 1994. Asimov’s laws of robotics: Implications for information technology. IEEE Computer 27(1): 57–66.Google Scholar
  8. Comanducci, Paolo. 1986. Le tre leggi della robotica e l’insegnamento della filosofia del diritto. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 36(1): 191–197.Google Scholar
  9. Davis, Jim. 2011. The (common) laws of man over (civilian) vehicles unmanned. Journal of Law, Information and Science 21(2). doi: 10.5778/JLIS.2011.21.Davis.1.
  10. Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. A matter of principle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law’s empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Floridi, Luciano, and Jeff Sanders. 2004. On the morality of artificial agents. Minds and Machines 14(3): 349–379.Google Scholar
  13. Franklin, Stan, and Art Graesser. 1997. Is it an agent, or just a program? A taxonomy for autonomous agents. In Intelligent agents III. Proceedings of the third international workshop on agent theories, architectures, and languages, ed. J.P. Müller, M.J. Wooldridge, and R. Nicholas, 21–35. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  14. Hart, Herbert L.A. 1961. The concept of law. Oxford: Clarendon (2nd edn, 1994).Google Scholar
  15. Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2010. Criminal liability and ‘smart’ environments. Conference on the philosophical foundations of criminal law at Rutgers-Newark, August 2009.Google Scholar
  16. Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2011. From Galatea 2.2 to Watson – And back?. IVR world conference, August 2011Google Scholar
  17. Hildebrandt, Mireille, Bert-Jaap Koops, and David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle. 2010. Bridging the accountability gap: Rights for new entities in the information society? Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 11(2): 497–561.Google Scholar
  18. Kurzweil, Ray. 2005. The singularity is near. New York: Viking.Google Scholar
  19. Lin, Patrick, George Bekey, and Keith Abney. 2007. Autonomous military robotics: Risk, ethics, and design. Report for US Department of Navy, Office of Naval Research. Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA.Google Scholar
  20. Moravec, Hans. 1999. Robot: Mere machine to transcendent mind. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Sartor, Giovanni. 2009. Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the intentionality of software agents. Artificial Intelligence and Law 17(4): 253–290.Google Scholar
  22. Wooldridge, Michael J., and Nicholas R. Jennings. 1995. Agent theories, architectures, and languages: A survey. In Intelligent agents, ed. M. Wooldridge and N.R. Jennings, 1–22. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ugo Pagallo
    • 1
  1. 1.Torino Law SchoolUniversity of TorinoTorinoItaly

Personalised recommendations