• Andrew Aberdein
  • Ian J. Dove
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 30)


The goal of this book is to explore the relationship between argumentation theory and the philosophy of mathematical practice. By ‘argumentation theory’ we intend the study of reasoning and argument, and especially those aspects not addressed (or not addressed well) by formal deduction. The great success of formal logic in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to an eclipse of informal techniques, but a revival began in the 1950s. These pioneers initiated a thriving research tradition with particular strengths in Canada and the Netherlands. The philosophy of mathematical practice diverges from mainstream philosophy of mathematics in the emphasis it places on what the majority of working mathematicians actually do, rather than on mathematical foundations, an issue most mathematicians ignore (rightly or wrongly). This leads to a closer relationship with history and sociology of mathematics, mathematics education, and mathematics itself. In the last decade philosophy of mathematical practice has been developed further by many authors, but the potential argumentation theory holds for this work has mostly been overlooked. This collection is designed to remedy that oversight.


Mathematics Education Mathematical Proof Mathematical Reasoning Mathematical Practice Argumentation Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Humanities and CommunicationFlorida Institute of TechnologyMelbourneUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Nevada, Las VegasLas VegasUSA

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