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Theories of Scientific Explanation

  • Erik Weber
  • Jeroen Van Bouwel
  • Leen De Vreese
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (Sect. 1.2). Then we present the problems that other philosophers have raised in connection with Hempel’s theory of explanation (Sect. 1.3). Subsequently, we clarify how the major research traditions in the field that have emerged after Hempel, can be seen as different reactions to these problems (Sect. 1.4). Finally, we discuss two of these reactions in more detail: Philip Kitcher’s unification account in Sect. 1.5 and Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical account in Sect. 1.6.

Keywords

Causal Process Unify Power Modus Ponens Causal Interaction Filling Instruction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent University (UGent)GhentBelgium

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