Abstract
Relying on Guichaoau (2010) and Des Forges (1999) this chapter places political developments and personal strategies in their historical context. I argue that the death of president Habyarimana created a power vacuum at the helm of the state which was filled by a small politico-military elite consisting of Akazu members and their close associates. They installed a government which implemented nationwide policy of genocide.
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Notes
- 1.
I refer to Alison Des Forges (1999) and André Guichaooua (2010) for a very detailed analysis of the facts of this period. I am responsible for the combination of arguments and interpretation offered here.
- 2.
Named after Colonel Kanyarengwe who fled Rwanda in 1980 after accusations that he was plotting against Habayrimana. He joined the RPF and was serving as its president. His participation in the RPF, being a Hutu, represented the unwanted cooperation between dissatisfied Hutu and the RPF.
- 3.
Recorded from RTML broadcasts, October 17–31, 1993, cited from Des Forges, p. 83.
- 4.
The president used the same words at the occasion of the MRND conference of April 28, 1992 in Kigali: “The farmers are the roots of our Movement. Party leaders should not stay in their offices… but go out and approach the farmers.” (My translation from the French transcript of his speech). The words used in Kinyarwanda ‘abahinzi borozi’ by the president translates to ‘farmers’ in English and to ‘agriculteurs-éleveurs’ in French and in includes cultivators who have one or a few cows or livestock, as many farmers do. The president considered this an efficient use of the land. It does not include ‘pastoralists’ meaning people for which herding cattle was a livelihood. As I have described in Chap. 2, the appeal to the farmer or the cultivator is understood by Habayarimana’s audience as an appeal to the Hutu.
- 5.
Des Forges, A. (2006), The Rwandan Genocide: How it was prepared, Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, April, p. 6.
- 6.
Bagosora stated several times that the war is another version of the age-old struggle between “The Hutu people” and the Tutsi, not between political parties. See Colonel BEMS Bagosora, T., (1995), L’assassinat du Président Habyarimana ou l’ultime operation du Tutsi pour sa reconquête du pouvoir par la force au Rwanda, Yaoundé, October 30, p. 7.
- 7.
See the transcripts of the interrogation of Bagosora on October 26–27, 2005 at the ICTR and the decision on the Tribunal on the Bagosora case of December 18, 2008.
- 8.
Colonel Nsabimana, D., (1992), to Liste A, Cmdt Sect OPS (Tous) No 1437/G2.2.4, September 21. Cited from the 2006 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper.
- 9.
Lt.Col.Anatole Nsengiyumva, (1992), Note au Chef EM AR, «Etat d’esprit des militaires et de la population civile, Kigali, July 27», the Linda Melvern archive.
- 10.
Itangazo, no. 5, ry’ishyaka CDR, 22 September, 1992.
- 11.
This section is based on Alison Des Forges (2006), HRW Briefing Paper.
- 12.
Melvern, L., 2004, Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan Genocide, Verso, London, New York, p. 20.
- 13.
Jean-Berchmans Nshimyumuremyi; Vice-Rector of the UNR, Butare Campus, to the Minister of National Defense, P2-18/813/90, December 26, 1990, Butare Prefecture.
- 14.
Rwanda Republic. Note to his Excellency the President. Subject: study of the means necessary for defence and to allow the population to counter any attack from inside or outside the country. Undated. Colonel Augustin Ndindiliyimana. Linda Melvern archive.
- 15.
Rwanda Republic. To the President and Minister in charge of Defence and Security. Subject: Minutes of Meeting. Rapporteur: Lt.Gregoire Rutakamize, 9 July 1991. Linda Melvern archive.
- 16.
Col.Déogratias Nsabimana to Monsieur Ministre de la Défense Nationale, no.181/G5.3.0, September 29, 1991.
- 17.
Déogratias Nsabimana, Général-Major, Chef EM AR, to the Minister of Defense, No. 0599/G3.9.2, Kigali, March 30, 1994. The Linda Melvern Archive, University of Wales.
- 18.
Le préfet de Kigali, Renzaho Tharcisse, Col.I.G. to Monsieur le Chef d’Etat-Major, no. 14/04.07, Kigali, March 31, 1994. The Linda Melvern Archive, University of Wales.
- 19.
In order to kill the Prime Minister, the Presidential Guard had to incapacitate ten Belgian Minuar soldiers and several Rwandan soldiers who were supposed to protect her. These ten Belgians were disarmed and brought to Camp Kigali were they were killed subsequently.
- 20.
In the meeting of the High Command several hours earlier he was seen to leave the room for a phonecall and, when he returned, he declared himself in favour of a military Crisis Committee to take over power (Guichaoau, 2010, 271). .
- 21.
The smoke screen interpretation is not shared by everyone. Augustin Cyiza for example believes that Nkundiye wanted civilians from the south to take responsibilities in the government, because the burden of the war was carried too much by the north (Guichoaua, 2010, 276).
- 22.
Colonel Gatsinzi, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the FAR also believes that there were two parallel actions going on: one military, of which he was in command and a second, secret, of which Bagosora was in command. The latter were executing a ‘pre-established plan’. (Colonel M. Gatsinzi, Ministry of Justice, Kigali, PV 0142, June 16, 1995).
- 23.
This action resembles very much the increase in the price of coffee paid to the producer after the start of the civil war , which, in my analysis (see Chap. 4) is a strategy to buy political loyalty, just as the Interim Government demonstrates with its payment of the salaries on April 10, 1994.
- 24.
Remark that in 1986 the regime rounded-up ‘loose women’ in Kigali who had to stand half-naked on the street before being transported to a re-education camp. Most of these women were Tutsi, of which several the girlfriends of expatriates. See Chap. 2.
- 25.
Lt. Col.Tharcisse Muvunyi, Comd. Place BUT-GIK, to Mons. Le Bourgmestre, no. 0085/MSC 1.1 April 21, 1994.
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Verwimp, P. (2013). Civil War, Multipartism, Coup d’etat and Genocide. In: Peasants in Power. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6434-7_7
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