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Enacting the Moral; Concrete Particularity and Subjunctive Space

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What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral

Part of the book series: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ((LOET,volume 31))

Abstract

This paper explores the nature of moral action. Its shows the mutability of what has been considered moral over time and is critical of its more contemporary identification with the ‘good will’ and good intentions. It argues instead for a circumscription of the arena of the moral to concrete and particular actions produced in the face of the overarching ambiguity which inheres in all our acts. It makes the counterintuitive claim that ritual practice provides an important propaedeutic to this type of moral action.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Though we must recall that 11,343 Greek, Macedonian and Thracian Jews who were then under Bulgarian administrative rule, were not saved but were deported and except for 12, all were murdered in concentration camps (Todorov 1999, p. 9).

  2. 2.

    On Mutazalite thought see: Martin et al. (1997), Makdisi (1991), pp. 50ff; Tierney (2008), p. 96, Stone (1965).

  3. 3.

    This argument is developed in greater depth in Seligman and Weller (2012).

  4. 4.

    The following argument is taken from A. Seligman et al. (2008).

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Correspondence to Adam B. Seligman .

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Seligman, A.B. (2013). Enacting the Moral; Concrete Particularity and Subjunctive Space. In: Musschenga, B., van Harskamp, A. (eds) What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6343-2_19

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