Are Humans Unique?

Abstract

In the introductory chapter, I addressed the central question of the “uniqueness” of humans. Since Darwin, it has became increasingly clear that with respect to our biological nature, there is no uniqueness: we are descendants of chimpanzee-like ancestors, and genetically we are more closely related to chimpanzees than chimpanzees to other non-human apes. As a consequence, the defenders of the “uniqueness view” concentrated—and still concentrate—on the search for certain cognitive or communicative abilities that would underline the uniqueness of humans—abilities that are not found in non-human animals even in rudimentary forms. However, during the past 50 years of extensive comparative behavioral, psychological, and neurobiological research, the once long list of alleged “unique” properties that included tool use and tool making, mental maps, action planning, imitation, mirror self-recognition, theory of mind, teaching, cultural transmission of knowledge, consciousness, self-reflection, a syntactical-grammatical language, a “theory of mind,” religion, morality, science, and art has become very short, and the defenders of human “uniqueness” are struggling for any feature that stands for a qualitative rather than quantitative difference between humans and non-human vertebrates.