Advertisement

My Mind Is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty as a Legal Concept

  • Jan-Christoph BublitzEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Trends in Augmentation of Human Performance book series (TAHP, volume 1)

Abstract

This chapter explores some of the legal issues raised by mind-interventions outside of therapeutic contexts. It is argued that the law will have to recognize a basic human right: cognitive liberty or mental self-determination which guarantees an individual’s sovereignty over her mind and entails the permission to both use and refuse neuroenhancements. Not only proponents but also critics of enhancements should embrace this right as they often ground their cases against enhancement on precisely the interests it protects, even though critics do not always seem to be aware of this. The contours and limits of cognitive liberty are sketched, indicating which reasons are good (or bad) grounds for political regulations of neurotechnologies.

Keywords

Neuroenhancement Cognitive liberty Law Human rights Political regulations 

References

  1. Alexy R (2003) Constitutional rights, balancing and rationality. Ratio Juris 16:131–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Basl J (2010) State neutrality and the ethics of human enhancement technologies. AJOB Neurosci 2:41CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Blitz MJ (2010) Freedom of thought for the extended mind. Cognitive enhancement and the constitution. Wisc Law Rev 2010:1049–1118Google Scholar
  4. Boire RG (2000) On cognitive liberty, part I. J Cogn Lib 1:7–13Google Scholar
  5. Boire RG (2003) On cognitive liberty, part IV. Mill and the liberty of inebriation. J Cogn Lib 4:15–23 (www.cognitiveliberty.org)Google Scholar
  6. Bostrom N, Roache R (2011) Smart policy: cognitive enhancement and the public interest. In: Savulescu J, ter Meulen R, Kahane G (eds) Enhancing human capacities. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  7. Bublitz JC (2010) Doping-Kontrollen im Staatsexamen? Leistungssteigernde Stimulantien und Chancengleichheit in Prüfungen. ZJS 3/2010, 306–317Google Scholar
  8. Bublitz JC, Merkel R (2009) Autonomy and authenticity of enhanced personality traits. Bioethics 7:360–374CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bublitz JC, Merkel R (2012) Crimes against minds. Crim Law Philos (forthcoming). DOI: 10.1007/s11572-012-9172-yGoogle Scholar
  10. Dees R (2010) Rawlsian “neutrality” and enhancement technologies. AJOB Neurosci 2:54CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Douglas T (2008) Moral enhancement. J Appl Philos 25:228–245PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Dresler M, Sandberg A, Ohla K, Bublitz JC, Trenado C, Mrozko-Wasowics A, Kühn S, Repantis D (2013) Non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement. J Neuropharmacol 1/2013, 64:529–543Google Scholar
  13. Fabre C (2006) Whose body is it anyway: justice and the integrity of the person. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Farah MJ, Illes J, Cook-Deegan R, Gardner H, Kandel E, King P, Parens E, Sahakian B, Wolpe P (2004) Neurocognitive enhancement: what can we do and what should we do? Nat Rev Neurosci 5:421–425PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Feenberg A (2002) Transforming technology. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  16. Fehr E, Kosfeld M, Heinrichs M, Zak P, Fischbacher U (2005) Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature 435:673–676PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Feinberg J (1986) Harm to self. Moral limits of criminal law, vol 3. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  18. Franck G (2005) Mentaler Kapitalismus. Hanser, MunichGoogle Scholar
  19. Galert T, Bublitz JC, Heuser I, Merkel R, Repantis D, Schöne-Seifert B, Talbot D (2009) Memorandum: Das optimierte Gehirn. Gehirn Geist 10:40–48Google Scholar
  20. Greely H, Campbell P, Sahakian B, Harris J, Kessler RC, Gazzaniga M, Farah MJ (2008) Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs by the healthy. Nature 456:702–705PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Grey B (2011) Neuroscience and emotional harm in tort law: rethinking the American approach to free-standing emotional distress claims. In: Freeman M (ed) Law and neuroscience. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  22. Halliburton C (2007) Letting Katz out of the bag: cognitive freedom and fourth amendment fidelity. Hastings Cent Law Rep 59:309–368Google Scholar
  23. Harel A (2004) Theories of rights. In: Golding M, Edmundson W (eds) Blackwell guide to the philosophy of law and legal theory. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  24. Hess E, Jokeit H (2009) Neurocapitalism. Orig. German in: Der Merkur 6/2009; engl. transl. www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-11-24-jokeit-en.html
  25. Höfling W (2006) Kommentar zu Art. 3 EU-GRCH. In: Tettinger P, Stern K (eds) Kölner Gemeinschaftskommentar zur EU-GRCH. Beck, MunichGoogle Scholar
  26. Hommel T (2010) Psychisch bedingte Fehlzeiten um 40 Prozent gestiegen. Ärzte Zeitung 20.07.2010Google Scholar
  27. Hoppe C (2009) Neuro-Enhancement: Kein Verbot, aber bitte auch keine Empfehlungen. http://www.brainlogs.de/blogs/blog/wirklichkeit/2009-10-09/neuro-enhancement-kein-verbot-aber-bitte-auch-keine-empfehlung. Accessed 17 Feb 2013
  28. Husak D (1989) Recreational drugs and paternalism. Law Philos 8:353–381CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Huxley A (1932) Brave new world. Chatto & Windus, LondonGoogle Scholar
  30. Huxley A (1962) Island. Chatto & Windus, LondonGoogle Scholar
  31. Kant I (1797) Metaphysik der Sitten. Academy Edition: Metaphysics of Morals (trans: Gregor M (1991)), vol 6. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  32. Kersting W (2007) Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie. Mentis, PaderbornGoogle Scholar
  33. Kipke R (2010) Was ist so anders am Neuroenhancement? Pharmakologische und mentale Selbstveränderung im ethischen Vergleich. Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik 15:69–99Google Scholar
  34. Klaming L, Vedder A (2010) Human enhancement for the common good – using neurotechnologies to improve eyewitness memory. AJOB Neurosci 3:22–33Google Scholar
  35. Kolber A (2006) Therapeutic forgetting: the ethical and legal implications of memory dampening. Vanderbilt Law Rev 59:1561–1626Google Scholar
  36. Levy N (2007) Neuroethics. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Marshall J (2009) Personal freedom through human rights law? Autonomy, identity and integrity under the European convention on human rights. Martinus Nijhoff, LeidenCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Merkel R (2007) Treatment – prevention – enhancement: normative foundations and limits. In: Merkel R, Boer G, Fegert J, Galert T, Hartmann D, Nuttin B, Rosahl S (eds) Intervening in the brain – changing psyche and society. Springer, Berlin, pp 285–378Google Scholar
  39. Metzinger T (2003) Being no one. MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  40. Metzinger T (2009) Ego tunnel. Basic Books, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  41. Mill JS (1859) On liberty. In: Bromwich D, Kateb G (eds) (2003) edn. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  42. Mithoefer M, Mithoefer T, Wagner M, Jerome L, Doblin R (2011) The safety and efficacy of ±3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine-assisted psychotherapy in subjects with chronic, treatment-resistant posttraumatic stress disorder: the first randomized controlled pilot study. J Psychopharmacol 4:439–452CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Parens E (2005) Authenticity and ambivalence: toward understanding the enhancement debate. Hastings Cent Rep 3:34–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Persson I, Savulescu J (2011) Unfit for the future? Human nature, scientific progress, and the need for moral enhancement. In: Savulescu J, ter Meulen R, Kahane G (eds) Enhancing human capacities. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  45. Pettit P, Smith M (1996) Freedom of belief and desire. J Philos 9:429–449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. President’s Council on Bioethics (2003) Beyond therapy. Biotechnology and the pursuit of happiness. President’s Council on Bioethics, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  47. Rawls J (2005) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  48. Repantis D, Laisney O, Heuser I (2010a) Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors and memantine for neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: a systematic review. J Pharmacol Res 61:473–480CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Repantis D, Laisney O, Heuser I (2010b) Modafinil and methylphenidate for neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: a systematic review. J Pharmacol Res 62:187–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Ripstein A (2009) Force and freedom. Kant’s legal and political philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  51. Robeyns I (2011) The capability approach. In: Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (www.sep.org)
  52. Rosa H, Scheuerman W (2009) High-speed society. Social acceleration, power and modernity. Pennsylvania State University Press, University ParkGoogle Scholar
  53. Sandberg A, Savulescu J (2011) The social and economic impacts of cognitive enhancements. In: Savulescu J, ter Meulen R, Kahane G (eds) Enhancing human capacities. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  54. Sandel M (2007) The case against perfection: ethics in the age of genetic engineering. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  55. Savulescu J (2006) Justice, fairness and enhancement. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1093:321–338PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Schermer M (2007) Brave new world versus Island – Utopian and dystopian views on psychopharmacology. Med Health Care Philos 10:119–128PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Sententia W (2004) Cognitive liberty and converging technologies for improving human cognition. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1013:221–228PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Taylor K (2004) Brainwashing. The science of thought control. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  59. Thomson JJ (1990) The realm of rights. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  60. Tovino SA (2007) Functional neuroimaging and the law. AJOB-Neurosci 9:44–56Google Scholar
  61. Vermeulen B (2006) Commentary on art. 9. In: van Dijk P, van Hoof F, van Rijn A, Zack L (eds) Theory and practice of the European convention on human rights, 4th edn. Intersentia, AntwerpenGoogle Scholar
  62. Vincent N (2012) Enhancing responsibility. In: Vincent N (ed) Legal responsibility and neuroscience. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  63. von der Pfordten D (2007) Kants Rechtsbegriff. Kant-Studien 98:431–442Google Scholar
  64. von Hirsch A (2008) Direct paternalism: criminalizing self-injurious conduct. Crim Justice Ethics 1:25–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of LawUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

Personalised recommendations