Ten Theses on Coherence in Law

  • Amalia Amaya
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 107)


The aim of this chapter is to advance the following theses: (1) The concept of coherence in law may be best understood in terms of constraint satisfaction; (2) Coherence-based inference is an explanatory kind of inference; (3) There are three main operations whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making: subtraction, addition, and re-interpretation; (4) Epistemic responsibility is a pivotal component in a theory of legal coherence; (5) Coherentist standards of legal justification vary with context; (6) Coherence-based legal reasoning is a variety of reasoning about ends; (7) There are three main reasons why coherence is a value worth pursuing in law: epistemic reasons, practical reasons, and constitutive reasons; (8) The main motivation of legal coherentism is to provide a non-skeptical alternative to formalism; (9) The coherence theory of legal justification is psychologically plausible and this provides an argument in favor of this theory; (10) Legal coherentism is an agent-centered theory of justification.


Constraint Satisfaction Legal Reasoning Epistemic Justification Virtue Epistemology Coherence Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Philosophical ResearchNational Autonomous University of MexicoCoyocanMexico

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