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Limits of Constraint Satisfaction Theory of Coherence as a Theory of (Legal) Reasoning

  • Michał Araszkiewicz
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 107)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the limits of the constraint satisfaction theory of coherence (CsCS) as a basis for a model of legal argumentation concerning questions about norms. The main thesis defended here is that CaCS is a promising basis for such model, but it has to overcome certain important objections. This paper focuses on objections of a technical nature, related to the problems of representation of arguments and relations between arguments in the framework of CaCS. The paper outlines possible ways of dealing with these difficulties and indicates a perspective of further research on the subject.

Keywords

Constraint Satisfaction Legal Reasoning Constraint Type Legal Conclusion Positive Constraint 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Legal Theory, Faculty of Law and AdministrationJagiellonian UniversityKrakówPoland

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